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SOBER SECOND THOUGHT?  KOREMATSU 
RECONSIDERED 
Mark R. Killenbeck* 
 
How to best describe and treat Korematsu v. United States?1  
A self-inflicted wound?2  It is certainly an exemplar of a case that 
in key respects tracks Justice Stephen Breyer’s caution about 
decisions that have “harm[ed] not just the Court, but the Nation.”3  
Part of an “Anticanon,” resting on “little more than naked racism 
and associated hokum” and “embod[ying] a set of propositions 
that all legitimate constitutional decisions must be prepared to 
refute”?4  Perhaps. Or is it simply an opinion and result that “has 
long stood out as a stain that is almost universally recognized as 
a shameful mistake”5?   
The aspersions are varied, voiced by a wide range of critics.  
The Supreme Court has now joined the chorus.  Provoked by 
 
        *Wylie H. Davis Distinguished Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law.  
Special thanks to Jack Balkin, Mark Graber, Steve Griffin, and Sandy Levinson for 
organizing a lengthy and immensely valuable online critique of an initial draft and to Josh 
Blackmun, Darrell Miller, Eric Muller, Christina Rodriguez, and Robert Tsai for 
participating in that exercise.  Mark Graber and Alex Nunn have been of immense help as I 
have wrestled with these matters, true friends and model scholars.  Shannon Stroud, Class of 
2020, Julian Sharp, Class of 2021, and Martin Arroyo, Class of 2022 (the best research 
assistants I have had in my thirty-plus years of doing this) provided outstanding support and 
incredible research results.  I am in their debt. 
1. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
2. Korematsu is not a charter member of that catalog of infamy, conjured up by Chief 
Justice Hughes, who declared “that in three notable instances the Court has suffered severely 
from self-inflicted wounds.”  CHARLES EVAN HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES–ITS FOUNDATIONS, METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS: AN INTERPRETATION 
50 (1936).  The three were, in the order discussed, Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, (1857), 
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1869), and Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co., 157 
U.S. 429 (1895).  Id. at 50-54. 
3. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 158 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
4. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380, 423 (2011).  He targets 
four decisions.  One–Dred Scott–is a holdover from the Hughes list, while the other three, 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), 
and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), are new recruits. 
5. Charlie Savage, Korematsu, Notorious Supreme Court Ruling on Japanese 
Internment, is Finally Tossed Out, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/W98A-
K7H3]. 
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Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and presumably speaking for the entire 
Court, Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. declared in Trump v. 
Hawaii that “Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was 
decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and–to be 
clear–’has no place in law under the Constitution.’”6  
The focus was on what Justice Sotomayor alleged were 
“stark parallels between the reasoning of this case and that of 
Korematsu.”7  Criticizing the government’s lack of candor in 
both, and in particular “superficial claim[s] of national security” 
in Trump, she offered grudging praise to the majority for its 
“formal repudiation of a shameful precedent [that] is laudable and 
long overdue.”8  But she insisted that that “does not make the . . . 
decision here acceptable or right,” arguing that the Court had 
“redeploy[ed] the same dangerous logic . . . and merely replace[d] 
one ‘gravely wrong’ decision with another.”9 
Some of her concerns are well-founded.  Both decisions 
emphasize alleged threats to national security, and both give 
extraordinary deference to executive branch decisions and 
actions.  That said, the comparison is both facile and misleading.  
It is, for example, tempting to focus on the role “dangerous 
stereotypes” and “impermissible hostility” played in the 
campaign rhetoric of Donald J. Trump.10  But the Court was not 
asked to assess the legal effect of an order Candidate Trump did 
not have the authority to promulgate and did not issue.  Rather, 
the question before it was what President Trump actually 
authorized in the third iteration of his immigration orders, 
Proclamation No. 9645.11   
 
6. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 
248 (Jackson, J., dissenting)).  Does this actually represent the views of all nine?  None 
writing separately said anything to the contrary.  That said, Professors Kende and Greene 
harbor doubts about  Justice Thomas, who has cited and/or relied on Korematsu in several 
cases.  See Mark S. Kende, Justice Clarence Thomas’s Korematsu Problem, 30 HARV. J. 
RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 293 (2014); Jamal Greene, Is Korematsu Good Law?, 128 YALE L. 
J. F. 629, 638-39 (2019). 
7. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
8. Id. at 2448. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 2447. 
11. See Proclamation No. 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for 
Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety 
Threats, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017).  The two earlier orders were Exec. Order No. 
13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017), and Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 
(Mar. 6, 2017).  Proclamation No. 9645 applied to eight nations, six of which were Muslim-
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We can and should compare and learn from the actions of 
both Franklin D. Roosevelt and Donald J. Trump.  But when 
rhetoric became reality there were stark and potentially 
dispositive differences between what a president actually did and 
the directives litigated in Korematsu and Trump. 
F.D.R.’s facially neutral order was transformed by racist 
underlings into an instrument of repression that made its focus on 
the Japanese and only the Japanese unmistakably clear.  
Korematsu was also litigated in the light of an extensive 
implementation record making the true nature and impact of the 
exclusion orders obvious to anyone willing to actually look.  In 
Trump, however, vicious and inappropriate campaign rhetoric 
pandering to then-candidate Trump’s base was absent from 
presidential proclamations that never mentioned or invoked the 
Muslim faith as a screening criterion.  Rather, each targeted only 
“foreign nationals who intend to commit terrorist attacks in the 
United States” or “intend to exploit United States immigration 
laws for malevolent purposes.”12  The ensuing litigation, in turn, 
did “name names” and identify groups.13  But it was undertaken 
on the basis of a sparse record that provided little real information 
 
majority (Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen).  Two (North Korea and Venezuela) 
have Muslim populations of less than 1%.  Chad has now been removed.  See Proclamation 
No. 9723, 83 Fed. Reg. 15,937 (April 10, 2018).  Six new countries were added.  See 
Proclamation No. 9983, 85 Fed. Reg. 6,699 (Jan. 31, 2020) (Burma (Myanmar), Eritrea, 
Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tanzania).  The net result was that thirteen nations were 
subject to the Trump ban, of which eight are Muslim-majority (Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, 
Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen).  For the data, see the Pew-Templeton Global 
Religious Futures Project.  PEW-TEMPLETON GLOBAL RELIGIOUS FUTURES PROJECT, DATA 
EXPLORER [https://perma.cc/8E6N-ZRGE].  Each of these orders and proclamations were 
revoked by President Biden on January 20, 2021.  See Proclamation No. 10,141, 86 Fed. 
Reg. 7,005 (Jan. 20, 2021). 
12. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977, 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017).  “Muslims” or 
“the Muslim faith” are never mentioned.  As I will note and discuss at various points, while 
that was true for each of the three orders, the final one was crafted with considerable care, a 
reality highlighted by Erica Newland, a former Justice Department attorney, whose crie de 
couer lamented her role in “ma[king] them more technocratic and therefore harder for the 
courts to block.”  Erica Newland, I’m Haunted by What I Did as a Lawyer in the Trump 
Justice Department, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/G47C-3R84].  Her 
account is, as one critic noted, naive at best.  See Steven Lubet, Should Those Who Served 
the Trump Administration Reluctantly Now Feel Remorse?, THE DISPATCH (Dec. 28, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/TQS7-XZGV].  
13. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2406 (2018) (noting the individual 
and group plaintiffs in that case). 
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about actual impact.14  Indeed, four years later we know very little 
about the systemic impact of the Proclamation on the groups 
supposedly at risk.  Publicly available accounts, both official and 
unofficial, are at best sketchy, providing only gross numbers of 
individuals “ineligible” for admission.15 
Those realities must be taken into account when someone 
alleges that there are “stark parallels” between the two cases.16  
They must also be examined if, as I think we must, we are to fairly 
assess what the Court actually did in Korematsu and whether we 
should now join the chorus embracing the proposition that it has 
absolutely no place in our system of law and justice. 
Chief Justice Roberts’ disagreements with Justice 
Sotomayor tell only part of the story.  Focusing on government 
actions countenanced by the Korematsu majority, he was correct: 
“[t]he forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, 
solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlawful 
and outside the scope of presidential authority.”17  But he was also 
on the right analytic path when he rejected attempts to “liken that 
morally repugnant order to a facially neutral policy denying 
certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission.”18   
Unfortunately, the discussion was terse, focusing solely on 
what Justice Sotomayor characterized as wartime orders and 
actions premised on an “‘odious, gravely injurious racial 
classification.’”19  That is consistent with the norms for virtually 
 
14. Each of the various lawsuits was litigated on a record that in meaningful ways made 
them the equivalent of a facial challenge.  Moreover, while recent information suggests that 
the Trump administration was successful in its quest to significantly curtail entries from the 
countries targeted, the public record offers few if any insights into why individuals have been 
barred.  See infra text accompanying notes 363-70. 
15. See, e.g., BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFS., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, IMPLEMENTATION 
OF PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS (P.P.) 9645 AND 9983, DECEMBER 8, 2017 TO JANUARY 
20, 2021[hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 2020 REPORT] [https://perma.cc/3NX9-WB23].  
The Department of State provided statistics on the implementation of Presidential 
Proclamations Nos. 9645 and 9983 on a monthly basis.  The first report was for December 
8, 2017 to September 14, 2019.  BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFS., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,  
IMPLEMENTATION OF PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION (PP) 9645, DECEMBER 8, 2017 TO 
SEPTEMBER 14,  2019 [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 2019 REPORT]  
[https://perma.cc/XG3T-3XQB].  I discuss the hows and whys of my views on available data 
infra at text accompanying notes 371-80. 
16. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
17. Id. at 2423. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 2447 (Sotomayor, dissenting) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 
515 U.S. 200, 275 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).  The condemnation is not universal.  
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all accounts of Korematsu.  But neither the Chief nor Justice 
Sotomayor devoted any attention to aspects of Korematsu that, at 
least for me, suggest that we treat its supposed repudiation with 
care. 
The impulse to condemn Korematsu is understandable and 
its reexamination in Trump consistent with what Chief Justice 
Harlan Fiske Stone characterized as “the sober second thought of 
the community, which is the firm base on which all law must 
ultimately rest.”20   
Stone’s focus was on whether a given decision is 
“subjective, that of the judge who must decide, or objective in 
terms of a considered judgment of what the community might 
regard as within the limits of the reasonable.”21  It is in this respect 
that Trump’s discussion of Korematsu reflects sober second 
thought.  As phrased and argued, Trump embraces the 
contemporary community judgment that racial profiling is 
anathema, an affront to the judicial obligation to protect 
“individual right[s] and justice which is the ideal of the common 
law.”22  What I would like to suggest is that this reappraisal be 
reappraised in the light of three distinct and interrelated problems. 
First, most critiques of Korematsu focus narrowly on the 
result of the case, the Court’s approval of the detention order.  
Very few take the time and effort to probe with care just why the 
case and the majority opinion developed as they did.  They 
 
See, e.g., MICHELLE MALKIN, IN DEFENSE OF INTERNMENT: THE CASE FOR ‘RACIAL 
PROFILING’ IN WORLD WAR II AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004) (crediting the “dire” 
military situation when the curfew and exclusion orders were issued and enforced); Craig 
Green, Ending the Korematsu Era: An Early View from the War on Terror Cases, 105 NW. 
U. L. REV. 983, 988 (2011) (arguing that Korematsu is best understood as a case in a line 
establishing “a permissive approach to asserted military necessity and unsupervised 
presidential activity”); Pamela Karlan & Richard Posner, The Triumph of Expedience: How 
America Lost the Election to the Courts,  HARPER’S MAG., May 2001, at 31, 39 (Judge 
Posner, arguing that while Korematsu was “tainted by racial prejudice” the case was 
“correctly decided” given fears of invasion and its status as “a military order in a frightening 
war.”).  See Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections of Civil Liberties in Wartime, 
2003 WIS. L. REV 273 (2003).  Tushnet in particular tries to place Korematsu in perspective, 
concluding “[h]ave I truly ‘defended’ Korematsu?  In one sense, yes.  I have tried to explain 
how decision-makers faced with what they understood to be a threat to the nation might 
engage in actions that in retrospective seem quite unjustified.”  Id. at 307. 
20. Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50  HARV. L. REV. 4, 25 
(1937).  
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 17. 
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should.  The blame for Korematsu is widespread, extending well 
beyond the narrow confines of Justice Hugo Black’s opinion for 
the Court and the contradictions and inconsistencies within it.  
Understanding and acknowledging why the decision was 
fashioned as it was is accordingly important.   
Second, reducing Korematsu to a simple judgment about the 
propriety of race and/or national origin based decisions fails to 
recognize that “[c]ases stand for multiple propositions” that “are 
often varied and contested.”23  In this instance, Korematsu’s 
embrace of naked racial stereotyping stands apart from and in 
stark contrast to its most important place in the constitutional 
order: articulation of precepts and terminology that provide the 
foundations for strict scrutiny.  Consignment to a constitutional 
black hole also denies us the insights that careful study of 
Korematsu offer regarding the moral dimensions of the 
constitutional canon and valuable lessons about how to litigate a 
case.  These are aspects of Korematsu that can and must be 
preserved.  Indeed, they are propositions I suspect even its most 
bitter critics would embrace. 
Finally, the impulse to treat Korematsu and Trump as two 
peas in the same pod does not do justice to either.  The parallels 
between the two cases seem obvious to most observers.  But they 
are also superficial, focusing on reflexive condemnation of results 
rather than studied attention to details.  I am not arguing that 
actual results do not matter, especially for litigants whose lives 
and welfare are placed at risk.  In particular, I am not saying that 
the Trump majority reached the right conclusions or that its 
methodology should be embraced.  But I do believe that the 
decision is not the unbridled evil its many critics depict. 
This is dangerous ground.  It risks creating the impression 
that I support what the Court did then and now, writ large.  
Nothing could be further from the truth.  I am not, for example, 
arguing for reflexive deference to executive decisions in such 
matters,24 much less any “driven primarily by [anti-Japanese and] 
anti-Muslim animus, rather than by the Government’s asserted 
 
23. Greene, supra note 6, at 630. 
24. On the general question of the presidency and immigration, see what is now the 
definitive take: ADAM B. COX & CHRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ,  THE PRESIDENT AND 
IMMIGRATION LAW (2020). 
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national-security justifications.”25  As I will establish, the record 
is quite clear regarding Korematsu and the Japanese: there is no 
possible explanation for what happened other than invidious 
discrimination on the basis of national origin and race.  It was, as 
Robert Tsai has so eloquently explained, an “egregious error[] of 
reason.”26 
That said, we simply do not have the facts necessary to reach 
similar conclusions about Trump.  My focus here is not the 
wisdom, or lack thereof, of the now late but (at least for me) 
hardly lamented Trump administration and its Travel Ban.  
Indeed, it is not even on the precise contours and merits of post-
Trump executive orders revoking much of the Trump 
immigration corpus.  It is, rather, whether the majority in Trump 
reached the right conclusion.  Was Proclamation 9645, given the 
posture of the case and due deference, a “reasonable” exercise of 
executive authority?  Or was it an unconstitutional initiative, 
fatally infected by religious animus? 
There is, at least that I have been able to find, no detailed 
account of how Proclamation 9645 was actually implemented.27  
We also do not have anything definitive allowing us to test Justice 
Breyer’s theory that careful examination of “the Proclamation’s 
elaborate system of exemptions and waivers” allows us to answer 
the key question: whether “the Proclamation’s promulgation or 
content” is significantly affected by religious animus against 
Muslims.28  Virtually all of the waiver claim cases litigated to date 
have focused on the delays involved in processing the 
applications and possible violations of the Administrative 
Procedures Act.  The results have been mixed.  Most courts have 
accepted the government’s claim that substantial processing 
delays are inherent in such matters and do not provide a basis for 
 
25. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2438 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
26. ROBERT L. TSAI, PRACTICAL EQUALITY: FORGING JUSTICE IN A DIVIDED NATION 
120 (2019). 
27. I discuss this infra at text accompanying notes 378-80. 
28. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2429 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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relief.29  Some APA claims have been accepted.30  But most 
constitutional challenges have failed and have not, surprisingly, 
at least that I have been able to find, pursued the anti-Muslim bias 
claim.31  
Trump does raise serious questions about the rule of law, 
especially when we take into account its departure from the 
military necessity rationales of Korematsu.  In particular, it 
exemplifies a form of “credulous deference” to executive 
judgments that comes dangerously close to the “subrational-basis 
standard” Justice William Brennan properly condemned in 
Goldman v. Weinberger.32  Many of these problems, however, are 
created by the posture of the case, including both the standard of 
review and the sparse record actually before the Court. 
It is important to remember that the majority made it quite 
clear that “[w]e express no view on the soundness of the policy.”33  
In particular, as Justice Kennedy warned, further judicial 
proceedings, if proper and available, were required to resolve the 
 
29. Compare, e.g., Motaghedi v. Pompeo, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1345 (E.D. Cal. 2020) 
(plausible claim for unreasonable delay in adjudicating waiver requests but no plausible due 
process or equal protection claims), and Moghaddam v. Pompeo, 424 F. Supp. 3d 104 
(D.D.C. 2020) (government with mandatory duty to determine eligibility for waiver), with 
Najafi v. Pompeo, 2020 WL 1067015 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 5, 2020) (granting government 
motion to dismiss in absence of objective standard to measure reasonableness of delay), and 
Didban v. Pompeo, 435 F. Supp. 3d 168 (D.D.C. 2020) (two-year delay in adjudicating 
waiver application not unreasonable).   
30. See, e.g., Motaghedi v. Pompeo, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1345 (E.D. Cal. 2020) 
(“plausible” APA claim). 
31. See, e.g., Razi v. Pompeo, 2020 WL 6262380, at *8-10 (S.D. Cal., Oct. 23, 2020) 
(no viable due process claims); Zafarmand v. Pompeo, 2020 WL 4702322, at *16-18 (N.D. 
Cal., Aug. 13, 2020) (no viable due process claims).  In particular, courts have rejected claims 
that non-citizens have the right to live in the United States with their spouse.  See, e.g., 
Zandieh v. Pompeo, 2020 WL 4346915, at *7 (D.D.C., July 29, 2020) (no “cognizable 
constitutional interest . . . in living in the United States with her spouse”).  See, e.g., 
Zafarmand v. Pompeo, 2020 WL 4702322, at *16 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 13, 2020) (rejecting an 
“‘integrity of the family unit’” claim, given that “‘the generic right to live with family is far 
removed from the specific right to reside in the United States with non-citizen family 
members’” (quoting Gebhardt v. Nielsen, 879 F.3d 980, 988 (9th Cir. 2018)); Darchini v. 
Pompeo, 2020 WL 3051089, at *7 (C.D. Cal., Mar. 18, 2020) (holding that “‘the generic 
right to live with family is far removed from the specific right to reside in the United States 
with non-citizen family members’”) (quoting Gebhardt, 879 F.3d at 988)). 
32. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 514-15 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).   
33. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).  Many critics have refused to 
acknowledge this. 
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key constitutional questions.34  That process is ongoing, with no 
firm end in sight.  Docket entries, albeit no published orders, 
indicate that the two cases that did make their way to the Court 
have, respectively, been dismissed with prejudice or voluntarily 
withdrawn.35  New challenges were filed, but presumably will be 
dismissed as moot in the wake of Biden Administration actions.36 
Trump is interesting but actually poses more questions than 
it answers.  Is it, for example, a case about presidential power per 
se?  Or simply a rumination on whether a particular president 
formulated an inappropriate policy?37  For current purposes my 
primary concern is the wisdom of treating Korematsu as a 
constitutional dead letter, believing as I do that its wholesale 
repudiation is inappropriate.   
I.  THE PROBLEM 
Is Korematsu dead?  Media observers certainly thought so, 
declaring that Trump gave the Court the opportunity to “seize[] 
the moment to finally overrule Korematsu.”38  Some parties are 
not persuaded.  Westlaw, an occasionally unreliable arbiter of 
such matters,39 now describes Korematsu as “abrogated,”40 a 
characterization another noted referee, the Bluebook, informs us 
 
34. Id. at 2424 (observing that “[w]hether judicial proceedings may properly continue 
in this case” given rule of “substantial deference . . . is a matter to be addressed in the first 
instance on remand”). 
35. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 961 F.3d 635 (4th Cir. 2020) 
(remand to district court with instructions to dismiss with prejudice); Hawaii v. Trump, 898 
F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2018) (remand to district court for further proceedings in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018)).  
36. See, e.g., Arab Am. Civ. Rts. League v. Trump, 399 F. Supp. 3d 717 (E.D. Mich. 
2019) (proclamation fails rational basis review and cannot be explained by anything other 
than anti-Muslim animus); Arab Am. Civ. Rts. League v. Trump, 2019 WL 5684371 (E.D. 
Mich., Nov. 1, 2019) (certifying motion to appeal). 
37. I am indebted to Christina Rodriguez for provoking this line of thought during the 
May 1, 2020, Yale Zoom session and in subsequent email exchanges.  I hope to explore it 
more fully in a brief future commentary. 
38. Savage, supra note 5. 
39.  I once waged a protracted battle with the editors of a top-20 (really!) journal about 
whether the Court had “overruled” Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).  Westlaw said it had.  Wrong.  Error since corrected. 
40. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  
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is not quite the same.41  For that matter, Professor Richard Primus 
argued that when Trump was decided that it did not actually meet 
the requirements for formal overrule, given that “a court only has 
authority to do what is part of deciding this case, and there is 
nothing about the travel ban decision that contradicts anything in 
Korematsu.”42   
In a related but distinctive vein, many simply find the 
situation contradictory and distasteful.  Justice Sotomayor 
embraced “formal repudiation of a shameful precedent [that] is 
laudable and long overdue,” even as she condemned the Trump 
majority for “redeploy[ing] the same dangerous logic underlying 
Korematsu and merely replac[ing] one ‘gravely wrong’ decision 
with another.”43  Internment camp survivors and their 
descendants in turn characterized the Court’s actions as 
“bittersweet,” a “hollow victory” given the “striking parallels . . . 
between their treatment and the logic [used] to justify keeping 
people out of the country.”44  It was, some argued, “not just empty 
but also grotesque.”45  And they castigated the majority for 
“perpetuat[ing] the very-near-blind deference to the executive 
branch that led the Korematsu Court astray.”46 
Korematsu is one of three decisions routinely characterized 
as the Japanese Exclusion Cases.  In the first, Hirabayashi v. 
United States,47 the Court answered one narrow question:  should 
it sustain the conviction of “an American citizen of Japanese 
ancestry” who violated a curfew order requiring that he “be within 
[his] place of residence daily between the hours of 8:00 p.m. and 
 
41. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R.10.7(c)(ii) (Columbia 
L. Rev. Ass’n et al. eds., 21st ed. 2020) (signal for “[c]ases that are effectively (but not 
explicitly) overruled or departed from by a later decision of the same court”). 
42. Becky Little, Korematsu Ruling on Japanese Internment: Condemned But Not 
Overruled, HISTORY (Sept. 1, 2018) (quoting Richard Primus) (alterations adopted) 
[https://perma.cc/FC5J-MA2Z] 
43. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2448 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
44. Jennifer Medina, For Survivors of Japanese Internment Camps, Court’s 
Korematsu Ruling is ‘Bittersweet’, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/CUX9-
G7ZV].  See also Karen Korematsu, How the Supreme Court Replaced One Injustice With 
Another,  N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018) [https://perma.cc/NDL2-YJ5V].  
45. Greene, supra note 6, at 629. 
46. Neal Kumar Katyal, Trump v. Hawaii: How the Supreme Court Simultaneously 
Overturned and Revived Korematsu, 128 YALE L. J. F. 641, 642 (2019). 
47. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
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6:00 a.m.”48  It did.  Based on its version of the facts and 
circumstances, the Court believed there was “a reasonable basis 
for the action taken in imposing the curfew.”49  In Korematsu, in 
turn, the issue was whether the Court should affirm Fred 
Korematsu’s conviction for intentionally refusing to cooperate 
with the government’s attempt “to exclude those of Japanese 
ancestry from the West Coast war area at the time they did.”50  
Again, it did, stating that “[t]here was evidence of disloyalty on 
the part of some, the military authorities considered the need for 
action was great, and time was short.”51  Finally, in the outlier in 
the sequence, Ex parte Mitsue Endo, the Court held that the 
government could not confine “a loyal and law-abiding citizen” 
to a relocation center when there was “no claim that she is 
detained on any [specific] charge or that she is suspected of 
disloyalty.”52 
The principle most people associate with Korematsu cannot 
possibly be defended.  At its heart it was a thinly veiled 
acceptance of the assumption that racial stereotyping vel non has 
a place in both national policy and the constitutional canon.  Most 
commentary at the time was critical.  Nanette Dembitz, a cousin 
of Justice Louis Dembitz Brandeis and one of the attorneys on the 
Brief for the United States in Hirabayashi, condemned 
“significant departures from social and legal precedent” and 
 
48. Id. at 81.  A companion case, Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943), 
addressed the same issue, but is seldom discussed.  For an extended discussion of 
Hirabayashi, see Eric L. Muller, Hirabayashi and the Invasion Evasion, 88 N.C. L. REV. 
1333 (2010) [hereinafter Muller, Invasion Evasion].  More recently, Eric warns us of the 
dangers posed by Hirabayashi, characterizing it as a decision supporting race-based 
government actions short of the detention rubric invoked in Korematsu.  See Eric L. Muller, 
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and the Second Monster, 98 TEX. L. REV. 735, 749-54 (2020) 
[hereinafter Muller, Second Monster]. 
49. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 101. 
50. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944).  For an excellent account 
of Fred Korematsu’s life and his case, see Mark Weisenmiller, Fred Korematsu’s War for 
America, 14 AMERICA IN WWII 36 (2018). 
51. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24.  This tracks one aspect of current strict scrutiny 
doctrine, that the government must adopt the “least restrictive alternative.” 
52. 323 U.S. 283, 294 (1944).  Endo was decided the same day as Korematsu and has 
largely faded into the background.  For an insightful discussion, see Patrick O. Gudridge, 
Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933 (2003).  The New York Times in turn finally 
recognized Ms. Endo and the importance of her case in an obituary published in its 
“Overlooked No More” series.  Stephanie Buck, Overlooked No More: Mitsuye Endo, A 
Name Linked to Justice for Japanese-Americans, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/NRA5-6PXU].   
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promulgation of “an insidious precedent.”53  Some was not.  
Charles Fairman, embracing a common but inaccurate belief, 
declared that “[t]he Japanese, including most of the Japanese-
Americans, have lived among us without becoming a part of 
us.”54  It could, accordingly, “hardly be said to be unreasonable 
to go on the assumption that among the Japanese communities 
along the coast there is enough disloyalty, potential if not active, 
to make it expedient to evacuate the whole.”55   
The Court countenanced and gave judicial force to executive 
branch decisions and actions tainted by racist motivations, in 
particular those of two people: Colonel Karl Bendetsen, who did 
much of the drafting; and the public face and primary moving 
force behind these decisions, Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, 
who infamously declared that “[a] Jap’s a Jap, it makes no 
difference whether he is an American citizen or not.”56  
These sentiments shaped the development and 
implementation of the order and the curfew and exclusion 
programs once F.D.R. allowed the process to go forward.  As the 
Court noted in Hirabayashi–without the slightest hint of 
condemnation–”‘reasons for suspected widespread fifth-column 
activity among Japanese’ were to be found in the system of dual 
citizenship which Japan deemed applicable to American-born 
Japanese, and in the propaganda disseminated by Japanese 
consuls, Buddhist priests and other leaders, among American-
 
53. Nanette Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme 
Court’s Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 175, 175, 239 (1945).  See also 
Harrop A. Freeman, Genesis, Exodus, and Leviticus: Genealogy, Evacuation, and Law, 28  
CORNELL L. Q. 414 (1943); Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese-American Cases–A Disaster, 
54 YALE L. J. 489 (1945).   
54. Charles Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency, 55  HARV. 
L. REV. 1253, 1301 (1942).  
55. Id. at 1302.  See also Maurice Alexandre, The Nisei – A Casualty of World War II, 
28  CORNELL L. Q. 385 (1943). 
56. Brief of Appellant at 1 n.2, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (No. 
42-870) [hereinafter Appellant’s Reply Brief].  The statement appeared in an article 
published in the San Francisco News on April 13, 1943.  Extracts from the article were 
submitted in an Appendix to the brief and it is clear that the Court had access to and should 
have known about it.  The statement was also quoted in Brief for Japanese American Citizens 
League as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 114 n.120, Hirabayashi v. United States, 
320 U.S. 81 (1943) (No. 42-870, 871) [hereinafter Hirabayashi Japanese American Citizens 
League Brief]. 
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born children of Japanese.”57  Not really.  As Justice Douglas 
noted, the issue before the Court was “a problem of loyalty not 
assimilation.”58  The proper standard was then “reasonable 
cause,” not “ancestry.”59  But, as counsel for Gordon Hirabayashi 
made clear, that was not what the government wanted, and the 
Court approved: 
The sum and substance of the government’s argument, 
however, is that because some small unidentified number of 
Japanese may be dangerous, it was proper to take action 
against them all.  That, we submit, is a position without 
merit.  For here action was not taken against any group which 
itself might have the elements which are considered 
dangerous—the action was not taken, for instance, against 
Shintoists, or against Japanese of dual citizenship, or against 
persons educated in Japan.  It was taken not against 
individuals who might be objectionable, but against a class, 
which the government admits was as a whole loyal.60 
The evidence of invidious bias was there.  The majority 
ignored it.  Indeed, Justice Black tried to deny any “racial 
antagonism,”61 complaining that “[t]o cast this case into the 
outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military 
dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue.”62  That 
glib dismissal whitewashed the record before the Court, for when 
examined with care there was “not a scintilla of evidence tending 
to prove [that] the military action taken was conceived in good 
faith.”63 
What sort of person would defend Korematsu?  Me.  
Consider for a moment another sacred judicial cow, Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas.64  Should it remain a part 
of the positive constitutional canon?  I recently argued that the 
answer is yes, but not because of what it teaches us and our 
students about the law.  Rather, it is worthy of respect given the 
 
57. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 90-91 (referring to and quoting a statement by the 
Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee on the floor of the Senate). 
58. Id. at 107 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
59. Id. at 108 (Douglas, J. concurring). 
60. Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 56, at 3 (internal citations omitted). 
61. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
62. Id. at 223. 
63. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944) (No. 22).  
64. See generally, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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lessons it instills about law’s handmaiden, justice.65  My premise 
is simple: Brown tells us little if anything about the rules that now 
govern the actual litigation of school desegregation cases.66  
Instead, the decision and its history instruct new generations how 
to frame and pursue causes of action that have at their heart full 
realization of the constitutional command that all members of our 
polity are entitled to the equal protection of the laws.  If the goal 
is to teach and eventually employ what the actual rules are and 
how to frame and defend a case in the year 2021, then teaching 
Brown wastes valuable time.  But if we are concerned about moral 
imperatives and true profiles in courage, then Brown and its 
history add immeasurably to the education of principled attorneys 
and citizens. 
I now embrace a parallel heresy.  We should accept and teach 
Korematsu as an exemplar of what the law regarding invidious 
discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, and national origin 
should be, as opposed to a decision associated with notions of 
justice for anyone, much less for groups the Court has 
characterized as “discreet and insular minorities.”67  Reflexive 
condemnation of Korematsu elevates form over substance.  In 
particular, it ignores foundations provided for doctrines and rules 
we now employ–and virtually all celebrate–any time a 
government action violates a core precept:  that classification 
based on race, ethnicity, or national origin are “invidious.”68  As 
such they must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, allowing us 
to “‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the 
 
65. Mark R. Killenbeck, Constitutional Heresy?, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 667, 680 (2018). 
66. See, e.g., id. at 673-76. 
67. That is the phrase assigned to especially vulnerable groups that have been singled 
out for persecution and are unable to protect themselves through the political process.  For 
the foundations of this doctrine, see United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-
53 n.4 (1938). 
68. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8, 11 (1967) (decrying “invidious 
discrimination based upon race” and both quoting and relying on Hirabayashi and 
Korematsu).  The Court has never stated what it means when it deems a classification 
invidious.  Rather, it provides only hints by analogy.  See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 
900, 914 (1995) (“Underlying [the] argument are the very stereotypical assumptions the 
Equal Protection Clause forbids.”); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 
(1991) (stressing the need to “dispel[] fears and preconceptions respecting racial attitudes”); 
Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1981) (rejecting a 
proffered justification as “rest[ing] on archaic stereotypes”). 
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legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant 
use of a highly suspect tool.”69   
Simply put, as Justice Anthony Kennedy reminds us, “[t]he 
Court first articulated the strict-scrutiny standard in 
Korematsu.”70  It is this aspect of Korematsu I accept, as opposed 
to a result that passively countenances thin government 
justifications in an attempt to defend the indefensible.  Accept, I 
must stress, does not mean celebrate, and I am not championing 
the result or those nakedly discriminatory aspects of Korematsu 
that others rightly condemn.  Rather, I am agreeing with Professor 
Greene’s observation that the Chief Justice’s statement 
repudiating that case “is not just empty but also grotesque,”71 
albeit for different reasons.   
In a similar vein, I neither defend nor accept the Trump 
majority’s silent embrace of key aspects of Korematsu.  They 
held, for example, that the express terms of the operative 
immigration statutes did not require the administration to 
narrowly define the group of individuals to be excluded, stating 
that “the word ‘class’ comfortably encompasses a group of people 
linked by nationality” and that the plaintiffs sought “an unspoken 
tailoring requirement found nowhere in Congress’s grant of 
authority to suspend entry of not only ‘any class of aliens’ but ‘all 
aliens.’”72  Oh please.  There is a substantial and dispositive 
difference between what is authorized and what is actually done.  
It is one thing to say that a statute might allow certain types of 
decisions.  It is quite another to hold that an actual determination 
does not violate constitutional norms.  General DeWitt, for 
example, departed from the “enemy alien” rubric in F.D.R.’s 
actual order and targeted only individuals of Japanese descent.73  
As such, this was precisely the sort of action that can survive if 
decisions actually made–as opposed to the theoretical parameters 
authorized–are given a degree of deference totally at odds with 
what the operative standards should be. 
 
69. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
70. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 316 (2013) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (Fisher I).  
71. Greene, supra note 6, at 629. 
72. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2410 (2018) (parsing the text of 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(f)).   
73. PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 65 (1983). 
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I am almost certainly alone, or at least isolated from the 
academic mainstream, in thinking that a case can be made that the 
Trump Court’s treatment of the third iteration of the immigration 
ban can be defended if–and these are very big ifs–we keep in mind 
that the manner in which it was litigated and if we accept the 
majority’s insistence that “the Proclamation is squarely within the 
scope of Presidential authority under the I[mmigration and] 
N[aturalization] A[ct].”74  So be it.  Especially since my focus is 
on key aspects of what the Court actually said and did in 
Korematsu, and the manner in which we can or should read its 
supposed repudiation. 
II.  KOREMATSU: THE BASICS 
Anyone interested in Korematsu’s origins, details, and flaws 
should read with care Peter Irons’s magisterial account, Justice at 
War,75 and numerous works by Eric Muller.76  That said, a brief 
reprise is appropriate, keeping in mind that virtually all who 
lambast the decision do so on the assumption that it was 
motivated by racism.   
Three factors are important.  The first is the mind set and 
actions of the individuals charged with overseeing security on the 
West Coast during World War II.  The second is the contents of a 
series of memoranda and reports prepared prior to and during the 
litigation of Hirabayashi and Korematsu.  The third is the impact 
that these realities, some of it knew, and some of which were 
hidden from it or it ignored, had on the decisions the Court 
fashioned. 
 
74. Trump, 138 U.S. at 2415.  
75. See generally Irons, supra note 73.  For a shorter but equally good treatment, see 
ROGER DANIELS, THE JAPANESE AMERICAN CASES: THE RULE OF LAW IN TIME OF WAR 
(2013).  Two additional resources are immensely helpful.  The first is the comprehensive 
report prepared by the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Citizens.  
COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL 
JUSTICE DENIED: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND 
INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS (1997) [hereinafter Personal Justice Denied].  The second is 
HYUNG-CHAN KIM, ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY (1992), a collection of pertinent cases. 
76. See, e.g., ERIC L. MULLER, AMERICAN INQUISITION: THE HUNT FOR JAPANESE 
DISLOYALTY IN WORLD WAR II (2007); Muller, Second Monster, supra note 48; Muller, 
Invasion Evasion, supra note 48. 
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A.  “A Jap’s a Jap” 
The train of events that led to the Japanese Exclusion Cases 
began with Executive Order 9066, which declared that “the 
successful prosecution of the war requires every possible 
protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-
defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense 
utilities.”77  As part of this, the “Secretary of War, and the Military 
Commanders whom he may from time to time designate” were 
authorized to take any “such action necessary or desirable, to 
prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as [they] 
may determine, from which any or all persons may be 
excluded.”78   
The Order was silent as to the race, ethnicity, or national 
origin of the individuals targeted.  Under its express terms, the 
proscriptions extended to “any or all persons,” a formulation that 
left the nature and scope of subsequent curfew or exclusion orders 
to the discretion of the designated implementing officials.79  That 
leeway was intentional and was a key factor in drafting 
subsequent orders and their implementation, within which two 
individuals assumed dispositive roles:  Karl Bendetsen, a member 
of the Judge Advocate Corps and General DeWitt, who oversaw 
implementation on the West Coast.80 
Many participants in the process had grave doubts about the 
constitutionality of race-based detention.  They also gave scant 
 
77. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942).  Congress subsequently 
passed the Act of Mar. 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173, which ratified the core 
terms of the Order.  President Gerald R. Ford formally terminated Executive Order 9066 on 
February 19, 1976.  See Proclamation No. 4417, 41 Fed. Reg. 7741 (Feb. 20, 1976). 
78. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407, 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942).   
79. Id. (emphasis added).  The same cannot be said of three prior directives issued in 
the immediate aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack.  See Proclamation No. 2525, 6 Fed. Reg. 
6321, 6321-22 (Dec. 10, 1941); Proclamation No. 2526, 6. Fed. Reg. 6323, 6324 (Dec. 10, 
1941); Proclamation No. 2527, 6 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6325 (Dec. 10, 1941).  Of the three, the 
one dealing with the Japanese was the most extensive and the only one, for example, that 
expressly forbid possession or use of certain things that might be employed for espionage or 
sabotage.  See Proclamation No. 2525, 6 Fed. Reg. 6321, 6322-23 (Dec. 10, 1941). 
80. Irons provides a lengthy and detailed discussion of the debates that led to the Order 
and the anti-Japanese sentiments, both military and political, that were part of that process.  
See Irons, supra note 73, at 30-64.  See also Eric L. Muller, Of Nazis, Americans, and 
Educating Against Catastrophe, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 323, 332-37 (2012) (discussing 
Bendetsen’s background and role in the drafting process). 
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credence to the notion that a Japanese invasion was imminent.81  
F.D.R., for example, “had no reason to fear a Japanese invasion 
of the West Coast.”82  They remonstrated, but lost,83 a battle 
fought with political and military figures who believed–some 
sincerely, and some for clearly discriminatory reasons–that it was 
necessary to “do something” about the Japanese on the West 
Coast.84   
Bendetsen, prodded by his superior, Provost Marshall 
General Allen W. Gullion, provided the foundations, predicated 
on the assumption that “by far the vast majority of those who have 
studied the Oriental assert that a substantial majority of the Nisei 
bear allegiance to Japan, are well controlled and disciplined by 
the enemy, and at the proper time will engage in organized 
sabotage, particularly, should a raid along the Pacific Coast be 
attempted by the Japanese.”85  F.D.R. himself actually paid scant 
attention.  Stressing that he simply wanted the Order to “be as 
reasonable as you can,” he left the fate of Japanese citizens and 
aliens in the United States to others, who supposedly would do 
only what was “dictated by military necessity.”86   
This indifference to the risks posed for a vulnerable minority 
was actually consistent with F.D.R.’s general record in such 
matters.  He “was no Eleanor Roosevelt; his record as President 
reflected a limited awareness of and attention to the plight of 
racial minorities.”87  His attention lay elsewhere, in particular on 
the need to complete the recovery from the Great Depression and 
wage a successful war against the forces of fascism.  This required 
the support of a Congress within which Southern senators and 
representatives, virtually all of whom were unbridled racists, 
exerted significant control.88  The net result, most agree, was that 
 
81. See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 75, at 10. 
82. Id.  
83. For an informative account, see FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 212-13, 
218-19 (1962). 
84. Daniels, supra note 75, at 10. 
85. Irons, supra note 73, at 49. 
86. Id. at 58 (internal quotations omitted). 
87. Id. at 57.  
88. Peter Irons, Politics and Principle: An Assessment of the Roosevelt Record on Civil 
Rights and Liberties, 59 WASH. L. REV. 693, 694, 697-99 (1984). 
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“Franklin D. Roosevelt did little to advance the cause of civil 
rights and liberties during his twelve years in the White House.”89 
Once in place, the scope and open-ended nature of the Order 
gave great leeway to the individuals charged with its 
implementation.  On the West Coast, they transformed it into a 
weapon wielded almost exclusively against Japanese citizens and 
aliens.  DeWitt intimated what would come, stating in early 1942 
that the focus would be on “any Japanese, German or Italian alien, 
or any person of Japanese ancestry.”90  The first part of that 
formulation targeted only aliens of the three nations waging war 
against the United States.  The second, however, designated the 
Japanese–and only the Japanese–as a group against whom 
sanctions would be levied.  This was confirmed in a subsequent 
Proclamation, which, after formulaically reciting the “all alien” 
language,91 focused narrowly on all persons of “Japanese 
ancestry,” forbidding them and only them for example from 
“us[ing] or operat[ing]” various items.92  
This stood in stark contrast to the approach employed by the 
individual responsible for security on the East Coast, General 
Hugh Aloysius Drum.  Each of his orders and proclamations were 
studiously neutral, extending their reach to all enemy aliens.93  As 
a result, curfew enforcement, confiscation of potential 
instruments of espionage and sabotage, and internment were 
levied against Japanese, German, and Italian residents alike, both 
citizen and alien.94   
Notably, there was little–if any–political or social will to act 
against the large ethnic German and Italian populations.  For 
 
89. Id. at 693.   
90. Public Proclamation No. 1, 7 Fed. Reg. 2320, 2321 (Mar. 26, 1942) (emphasis 
added). 
91. Public Proclamation No. 3, 7 Fed. Reg. 2543, 2543 (April 2, 1942). 
92. Id. at 2543-44.  
93. See, e.g., Public Proclamation No. 1, 7 Fed. Reg. 3830, 3831 (May 22, 1942) 
(limiting sanctions for violations to “an alien enemy”); Public Proclamation No. 2, 7 Fed. 
Reg. 7335, 7336 (Sept. 18, 1942) (focusing on “any person” and/or “an alien enemy”) 
(limiting possession or use of various devices to “[n]o person not in the armed forces of the 
United States”). 
94. For accounts, see  LAWRENCE DISTASI , UNA STORIA SEGRETA: THE SECRET 
HISTORY OF ITALIAN AMERICAN EVACUATION AND INTERNMENT DURING WORLD WAR II 
(2001); STEPHEN FOX, AMERICA’S INVISIBLE GULAG: A BIOGRAPHY OF GERMAN 
AMERICAN INTERNMENT & EXCLUSION IN WORLD WAR II (2000). 
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example, “[t]he Italians were virtually dismissed as a threat.”95  
The Germans were less well regarded, but there was nevertheless 
little appetite for mass action or detentions.  This was surprising, 
given the visibility and activities of the German-American Bund 
in the years prior to World War II and devastatingly effective 
German activities on the East Coast during the early months of 
the war.  The Bund had held mass rallies in New York and had 
large summer camps in that area where it indoctrinated and 
trained American youth.96  It embraced “a program of action to 
further Hitler’s cause in this nation–a program of infiltration 
which conforms to the pattern adopted by the Nazis in country 
after country.”97  And its active and visible membership provided 
the basis for various prosecutions, some of which were 
successful.98  
It was in turn the German navy, not the Japanese, that “pulled 
off one of the greatest merchant-ship massacres in history during 
the first four months of 1942.”99  Characterized as the “happy 
time” by those who undertook the assault, the early months of the 
war saw “highly successful U-boat attacks, a few of them in full 
view of bathers on American beaches [that] sank hundreds of 
thousands of tons of shipping at little cost.”100  And it was German 
agents, not Japanese, who landed, were apprehended, and 
executed when they attempted to enter the United States “for the 
purpose of destroying property used or useful in prosecuting the 
war . . . a hostile and warlike act.”101   
Nevertheless, as the Commission on Wartime Relocation 
stressed, “[n]o effective, organized anti-German and anti-Italian 
agitation aroused the public as it had against the ethnic Japanese 
 
95. Personal Justice Denied, supra note 75, at 287. 
96. See Sarah Churchwell, American Fascism: It Has Happened Here, N.Y. REV. 
(June 22, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9AXT-5Z28]. 
97. Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 668 (1946).  
98. See, e.g., Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 482 (1945) (“There is basis for 
suspicion of subversive conduct; there is matter offensive to one’s sense of loyalty to our 
Government’s policies.”); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 57 (1945) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (noting role as officer of a pro-German organization as an element in prosecution 
for treason).  
99. SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE ATLANTIC BATTLE WON: MAY 1943-MAY 1945 7 
(1959). 
100. ROGER DANIELS, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE WAR YEARS, 1939-1945 250 
(2016) (internal quotations omitted). 
101. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942). 
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on the West Coast, and the War Department, although it 
considered moving some classes or categories of Germans, was 
not sufficiently persuaded to press the President to allow it.”102  
General DeWitt occasionally pursued various German and Italian 
residents, declaring, disingenuously, that there would be “[n]o 
exceptions” to his policies.103  But only the Japanese were 
formally targeted as a group and denied individualized 
consideration, and only on the West Coast.   
DeWitt was born in Nebraska and spent most of his life in 
the Army.  He was not, accordingly, shaped by a California 
upbringing, subject to that state’s “familiar . . . attitudes of race 
prejudice.”104  That said, various aspects of his career prior to the 
war had a distinct influence on him: 
DeWitt’s long career in a segregated army and in particular 
his service in the Philippines, service that could hardly have 
shielded him from the virulent anti-Asian racism that 
pervaded the occupying American Army, had infected him 
(along with many of his military colleagues) with the virus 
of prejudice toward blacks and Asians.105 
Irons concedes that “fear” was a factor in DeWitt’s conduct, 
noting that “[a]long with the civilian residents of the West Coast, 
John DeWitt, despite his military background, shared a severe 
case of Pearl Harbor panic.”106  This included concerns about 
potential Japanese invasion, espionage, and sabotage, and his own 
fate if he fell short in meeting his obligations.   
These factors cannot be ignored given the Court’s 
subsequent focus on the extent to which military authorities 
“ha[d] reasonable ground for believing that the [military] threat 
 
102. Personal Justice Denied, supra note 75, at 287.  
103. See David A. Taylor, During World War II, the U.S. Saw Italian-Americans as a 
Threat to Homeland Security, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Feb. 2, 2017), (noting the attempt to 
arrest Joe DiMaggio’s father and the FBI’s refusal to do so)  [https://perma.cc/YFH3-
YAXP].  
104. Rostow, supra note 53, at 496.  
105. Irons, supra note 73, at 26. 
106. Id.  For example, in the wake of the Pearl Harbor attack the two military 
commanders in Hawaii, General Walter C. Short and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, were 
summarily and unjustly dismissed.  DeWitt was acutely aware of this and stressed that he 
was “‘not going to be a second General Short.’”  Personal Justice Denied, supra note 75, at 
65 (quoting General DeWitt). 
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[on the West Coast] [wa]s real.”107  Nevertheless, both the intense 
focus on the Japanese in his proclamations and orders and 
numerous statements by him provide incontrovertible support for 
the presence of what the Court has routinely condemned in other 
contexts as “impermissible . . . invidious intent to injure a racial 
minority.”108  As the attorneys representing Gordon Hirabayashi 
made clear at the time, “recent testimony by General DeWitt 
indicates that prejudice dominated his thinking.”109  The focus:  
DeWitt’s infamous statement that regardless of citizenship, “A 
Jap’s a Jap.”110   
This was simply one of many such pronouncements.  In a 
meeting in his office on January 4, 1942, DeWitt argued that the 
mere act of becoming a citizen could not cure the problems posed 
by Japanese ancestry, stating: 
In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities are 
not severed by migration.  The Japanese race is an enemy 
race and while many second and third generation Japanese 
born on United States soil, possessed of United States 
citizenship, have become “Americanized,” the racial strains 
are undiluted.  To conclude otherwise is to expect that 
children born of white parents on Japanese soil sever all 
racial affinity and become loyal Japanese subjects, ready to 
fight and, if necessary, to die for Japan in a war against the 
nation of their parents . . . .  It, therefore, follows that along 
the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies of 
Japanese extraction, are at large today.111 
He expressed similar sentiments in a telephone conversation 
on January 14, 1943: 
DeWitt:  I don’t see how they can determine the loyalty of a 
Jap by interrogation . . . or investigation. 
Gullion:  They’ve got a questionnaire that the Navy–some 
psychologists over there in the Navy sold to them. 
 
107. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 95 (1943); see also Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 220 (1944) (stressing the nature of actions taken “under 
circumstances of direst emergency and peril”). 
108. Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 304 (2014). 
109. Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 56, at 1 n.2. 
110. Id. 
111. Personal Justice Denied, supra note 75, at 66. 
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DeWitt:  There isn’t such a thing as a loyal Japanese and it 
is just impossible to determine their loyalty by investigation–
it just can’t be done.112 
        Most notably, DeWitt made his views about the Japanese 
extraordinarily clear in his testimony before the House Naval 
Affairs Subcommittee on April 13, 1943, during which he 
discounted any problems posed by Germans and Italians and 
made his anti-Japanese views abundantly clear: 
Gen. DeWitt:  I have the mission of defending this coast and 
securing vital installations.  The danger of the Japanese was, 
and is now–if they are permitted to come back–espionage 
and sabotage.  It makes no difference whether he is an 
American citizen, he is still a Japanese.  American 
citizenship does not necessarily determine loyalty. 
Mr. Bates:  You draw a distinction then between Japanese 
and Italians and Germans?  We have a great number of 
Italians and Germans and we think they are fine citizens.  
There may be exceptions. 
Gen. DeWitt:  You needn’t worry about the Italians at all 
except in certain cases.  Also the same for Germans except 
in individual cases.  But we must worry about the Japanese 
all the time until he is wiped off the map.  Sabotage and 
espionage will make problems so long as he is allowed in 
this area–problems which I don’t want to have to worry 
about.113 
DeWitt was both the officer in charge and the public face of 
the West Coast detention program.  As the Commission on 
Wartime Relocation subsequently stressed, with obvious 
justification, “[t]hese declarations came at important moments 
when the General could fairly be expected to speak his mind.  
Those who had agitated against the Japanese in the forty years 
 
112. Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445, 1452 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (from 
the transcript of a telephone conversation between General Dewitt and Major General A.W. 
Guillion), aff’d, in part, rev’d in part, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987).  The district court 
opinion is part of the efforts of Fred Korematsu and Gordon Hirabayashi to have their 
convictions overturned via writs of coram nobis.  See also Korematsu v. United States, 584 
F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).  The writs were granted, and the various opinions are a rich 
source of key information. 
113. Personal Justice Denied, supra note 75, at 66 (discussing exclusionary policy 
before a subcommittee of the House Naval Affairs Committee).  All three of these statements 
and conversations took place before Hirabayashi was decided on June 21, 1943.  That said, 
only one was public: his congressional testimony. 
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before the war could not have given the racial argument more 
blood-chilling bluntness.”114 
DeWitt was not alone in this.  Earl Warren noted in his 
memoirs that “[t]he atmosphere was so charged with anti-
Japanese feeling that I do not recall a single public officer 
responsible for the security of the state who testified against a 
relocation proposal.”115  Indeed, Warren himself harbored 
sentiments that closely tracked those expressed by DeWitt: 
[W]hen we are dealing with the Caucasian race, we have 
methods that will test the loyalty of them; and we believe 
that we can, in dealing with the Germans and Italians, arrive 
at some fairly sound conclusions.  . . . [W]hen we deal with 
the Japanese, we are in an entirely different field and we 
cannot form any opinion . . . [because of] [t]heir method of 
living.116 
None of this arguably matters if the Court was unaware of it.  
But it was.  The “A Jap’s a Jap” statement was brought to its 
attention in a reply brief filed by Gordon Hirabayashi’s attorneys 
and in two friend of the Court filings.117  That remark, by the 
individual who promulgated and administered the curfew and 
exclusion orders, should have been cause for alarm.  A supporting 
brief filed by the Japanese American Citizens League also 
signaled the need to exercise caution.  It provided lengthy and 
detailed documentation of racist impulses, noting and stressing 
the need to “remain free from any trace of their odious concepts 
and excesses.”118  The government itself tacitly acknowledged the 
need to consider such factors, describing “special problems” 
posed by the arrival of the Japanese in this country and noting that 
“[t]he intensity of the situation . . . has fluctuated under the 
 
114. Id. 
115. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 148 (1977). 
116. G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 71 (1982) (testifying before 
a congressional committee on “National Defense Migration.”).  For a lengthy discussion, see 
Sandhya Ramadas, How Earl Warren Previewed Today’s Civil Liberties Debate–And Got It 
Right in the End, 16  ASIAN AM. L. J. 73 (2009). 
117. See Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 56, at 1 n.2; Hirabayashi Japanese 
American Citizens League Brief, supra note 56, at 114; Brief of the American Civil Liberties 
Union as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 8, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 
81 (1943) (No. 42-870, 871).  
118. Hirabayashi Japanese American Citizens League Brief, supra note 56, at 12.  See 
also id. at 64 (arguing that many of the justifications advanced by the government could be 
used to sanction Nazi Germany’s treatment of the Jews). 
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stimulus of politics and some parts of the press.”119  Several of 
the footnotes in that brief also pointed the Court toward overtly 
discriminatory state legislation.120  And it identified an extensive 
literature describing the “Japanese Problem.”121   
The evidence was there.  The Court ignored it.  This was not 
simply a matter of dismissing as specious or trivial observations 
like President Roosevelt’s statement that “I don’t care so much 
about the Italians[.]  They are a lot of opera singers[.]”122  Rather, 
it reflected a calculated effort to obscure or ignore serious 
evidence that the policies pursued by the government were 
premised on “[d]istinctions between citizens [drawn] solely 
because of their ancestry.”123  Those characterizations were 
exactly what the Court supposedly condemned: “odious.”124  But 
they were neither acknowledged nor tested by anything remotely 
representing Korematsu’s promise such judgments “are 
immediately suspect” and must be “subject[ed] . . . to the most 
rigid scrutiny.”125 
B.  Dogs That Could Not Bark 
A second major factor in both Hirabayashi and Korematsu 
was the government’s decision to withhold or discount official 
documents and stark evidence that cast serious doubts on the 
national security justifications proffered to the Court.   
The most important was a memorandum prepared by 
Lieutenant Commander Kenneth D. Ringle of the Office of Naval 
 
119. Brief for the United States at 19-20, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 
(1943) (No. 42-870) [hereinafter Hirabayashi Brief].  
120. See id. at 20 n.18-19. 
121. Id. at 19-21.  See, e.g., Eliot Grinnell Mears, RESIDENT ORIENTALS ON THE 
AMERICAN PACIFIC COAST: THEIR LEGAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS 19 (1928) 
(“Californians have inherited a distinct color prejudice.”). Id. at 156 (noting the “local 
prejudice” against the Japanese is now “more pronounced” than prior prejudice against the 
Chinese).  The Mears volume, with pin cites to these statements and others to similar effect, 
was cited in notes 16, 17, 20, and 22.  Hirabayashi Brief, supra note 119, at 20-21.   
122. Biddle, supra note 83, at 207.  For an argument that these sorts of sentiments 
spared Italian-Americans from the same degree of enmity voiced against Japanese and 
German-Americans, see Thomas Guglielmo, The Forgotten Enemy: Wartime 
Representations of Italians in American Popular Culture, 1941-1945, 18 ITALIAN 
AMERICANA 5 (2000). 
123. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) 
124. Id. 
125. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
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Intelligence.  Ringle was an experienced officer with a deep 
knowledge of the Japanese and the situation in both Hawaii and 
on the West Coast.126  Given his experience and expertise, 
Admiral Harold R. Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, asked 
him to assess the situation.  Ringle concluded that “[t]he alien 
menace is no longer paramount” and that “the most dangerous 
[Japanese] are either already in custodial detention or . . . fairly 
well known to the Naval Intelligence service or the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.”127  He did concede that there were some 
individuals who “are essentially and inherently Japanese and may 
have been deliberately sent back to the United States by the 
Japanese government to act as agents.”128  But he bluntly 
discounted much of the case for race-based measures: 
[I]n short, the entire “Japanese Problem” has been magnified 
out of its true proportion, largely because of the physical 
characteristics of the people; that it is no more serious tha[n] 
the problems of the German, Italian, and Communistic 
portions of the United States population, and, finally that it 
should be handled on the basis of the individual, regardless 
of citizenship, and not on a racial basis.129 
Ringle’s report came to the attention of Edward J. Ennis, the 
Director of the Alien Enemy Control Unit in the Department of 
Justice, who was on the brief for Hirabayashi.  He was deeply 
alarmed by what he saw in both the actual Ringle report and a 
version of it that had been published anonymously.130  He sent a 
memorandum reflecting his concerns to Solicitor General Charles 
 
126. For a debate about Ringle and his report, see Charles J. Sheehan, Solicitor General 
Charles Fahy and Honorable Defense of the Japanese-American Exclusion Cases, 54 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 469 (2014); Peter Irons, How Solicitor General Charles Fahy Misled the 
Supreme Court in the Japanese American Internment Cases: A Reply to Charles Sheehan, 
55 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 208 (2015); and Charles J. Sheehan, Charles Fahy’s “Brilliant Public 
Service as Solicitor General”: A Reply to Peter Irons, 55 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 347 (2015).  
Charles Fahy was Solicitor General and argued both Hirabayashi and Korematsu.  Sheehan 
was Fahy’s grandson.  His defense of Fahy was largely an ad hominem attack on Ringle, 
Irons, and Neal Katyal, the Acting Solicitor General who subsequently “confessed error” in 
both cases.  See Neal Kumar Katyal, The Solicitor General and Confession of Error, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3027 (2013). 
127. NAVAL HIST. AND HERITAGE COMMAND, SER. NO. 01742316, RINGLE REPORT 
ON JAPANESE INTERNMENT I(a), I(d) (1941) [https://perma.cc/8KVM-37WL].  
128. Id. at I(f). 
129. Id. at I(h). 
130. See An Intelligence Officer, The Japanese in America: The Problem and the 
Solution, HARPER’S MAG., Oct. 1942, at 489. 
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Fahy on April 30, 1943, shortly before the brief was due and the 
case would be argued.131  In it he stated that “we must consider 
most carefully what our obligation to the Court is in view of the 
fact that the responsible Intelligence agency regarded a selective 
evacuation as not only sufficient but preferable.”132  And he 
stressed that “any other course of conduct might approximate the 
suppression of evidence.”133 
Fahy did not heed the warning.  Neither the actual Ringle 
Report nor the Ennis Memorandum were given to the Court.  
Rather, Ringle’s views were reduced to the musings of the 
“anonymous” author of the article in Harper’s and were, in what 
is arguably the best tradition of studious advocacy, characterized 
by the parties in diametrically opposed ways.134  In the 
government’s accounting, Ringle’s study was reduced to a 
finding that “[t]here was a basis for concluding that some persons 
of Japanese ancestry, although American citizens, had formed an 
attachment to, and sympathy and enthusiasm for, Japan.”135  Fred 
Korematsu’s amici, on the other hand, worked their way past that 
minor concession and emphasized that one of “those who were 
closest to the problem, and who, indeed, had the responsibility of 
protecting the coast from subversive activity”136 had concluded 
that “‘[t]he entire ‘Japanese Problem’ has been magnified out of 
its true proportion, largely because of the physical characteristics 
of the people.  It should be handled on the basis of the individual, 
regardless of citizenship, and not on a racial basis.’”137  Indeed, 
the American Civil Liberties Union argued that Ringle’s views 
could not be discounted, stressing that the author “it is almost 
certainly from O[ffice of] N[aval] I[ntelligence], which has 
 
131. See Memorandum from Edward J. Ennis to the Solic. Gen. (Apr. 30, 1943) 
[https://perma.cc/8QGL-XLKF].  For an extended discussion of the Final Report episode, 
see IRONS, supra note 73, at 278-310. 
132. Ennis, supra note 131, at 3. 
133. Id. at 4. 
134. See Hirabayashi Brief, supra note 119, at 12 n.3; Brief for Japanese American 
Citizens League as Amici Curaei Supporting Appellants at 107-08, Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (No. 44-22) [hereinafter Korematsu Japanese American 
Citizens League Brief].   
135. Hirabayashi Brief, supra note 119, at 12 n.3. 
136. Korematsu Japanese American Citizens League Brief, supra note 134, at 107. 
137. Id. at 107-08 (emphasis in the original). 
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always been understood as primarily concerned with Japanese 
intelligence work.”138  
A year later, Ennis waged a second, partially successful 
battle before Korematsu was briefed and argued, focusing on a 
document prepared at the direction of General DeWitt and signed 
off by him, the Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West 
Coast 1942.139  It stated in no uncertain terms that “[t]he 
continued presence of a large, unassimilated, tightly knit racial 
group, bound to an enemy nation by strong ties of race, culture, 
custom and religion along a frontier vulnerable to attack 
constituted a menace which had to be dealt with.”140  Ennis 
warned Herbert Wechsler, Assistant Attorney General in charge 
of the War Division, that the Final Report contained “willful 
historical inaccuracies” of which General DeWitt was aware.141  
He also noted, and attached, documents from J. Edgar Hoover and 
James Lawrence Fly “establish[ing] clearly that the facts are not 
as General DeWitt states in his report and also that General 
DeWitt knew them to be contrary to his report.”142   
Hoover declared that the FBI had “no information” in its 
possession supported reports of “submarine activities and 
espionage activity on the West Coast . . . immediately after Pearl 
Harbor.”143  He also derided much of the “evidence” on which 
DeWitt and others relied, characterizing it as reflecting “hysteria 
and lack of judgment.”144  Fly, in turn, stated that “[t]here were 
no radio signals . . . which could not be identified” and that in “the 
Commission’s experience . . . reports of unlawful radio signaling 
along the West Coast . . . were unfounded.”145  As John L. 
Burling, Assistant Director of the Alien Enemy Control Unit in 
 
138. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Appellants at 23 n.11, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (No. 44-22). 
139. FINAL REPORT: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 1942 (1943). 
140. Id. at vii. 
141. Memorandum from Edward J. Ennis to Herbert Wechsler at 2 (Sept. 30, 1944) 
[https://perma.cc/6NXU-YAEY]. 
142. Id. at 4.  See Office Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Att’y Gen. (Feb. 
7, 1944), [hereinafter Hoover Memorandum] [https://perma.cc/M6U3-G6HJ]; Letter from 
James Lawrence Fly to Att’y Gen. (Apr. 4, 1944), [hereinafter Fly Letter] 
[https://perma.cc/ZG3L-J6CN].  Fly was Chairman of the Federal Communications 
Commission. 
143. Hoover Memorandum, supra note 142. 
144. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 75, at 64 (alterations adopted). 
145. Fly Letter, supra note 142, at 3. 
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the Department of Justice, stressed in a September 11, 1944 
memorandum to Wechsler: 
You will recall that General DeWitt’s report makes flat 
statements concerning radio transmissions and ship-to-shore 
signaling which are categorically denied by the FBI and the 
Federal Communications Commission.  There is no doubt 
that these statements were intentional falsehoods, inasmuch 
as the Federal Communications Commission reported in 
detail to General DeWitt on the absence of any illegal radio 
transmission.146 
The information was clearly significant.  It was suppressed.  
A battle was then fought about a footnote in the government’s 
brief regarding the significance and value of the Final Report.147  
Changes were proposed that would have made it clear that there 
were reasons to doubt General DeWitt’s accounts of the situation 
and his motives for promulgating and enforcing a race-based 
internment program.  They were ignored.  The sole concession 
was a vague statement that the Final Report should be relied on 
only “for statistics and other details concerning the actual 
evacuation and events that took place subsequent thereto.”148   
The Court was never formally apprised of the Ennis or 
Hoover memoranda or the Fly letter.  “When [Solicitor General] 
Fahy returned to the Court to defend the exclusion order that 
Korematsu had challenged, he concealed from the Justices all 
evidence of an internal insurrection that he had quashed just days 
before.”149  Instead, Fahy assured the Court that there was indeed 
a factual basis for DeWitt’s actions and denied that there was “‘a 
single line, a single word, or a single syllable’ in the [final] report 
[that] could cast any doubt on the ‘military necessity’ basis for 
DeWitt’s orders.”150 
 
146. Memorandum from J. L. Burling to Herbert Wechsler (Sept. 11, 1944) reprinted 
in Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1423-24 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
147. See IRONS, supra note 73, at 287-92. 
148. Brief for the United States at 11 n.2, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944) (No. 44-22).  For a detailed discussion of the “footnote war,” see Irons, supra note 
73, at 287-92. 
149. Peter Irons, Fancy Dancing in the Marble Palace, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 35, 39 
(1986). 
150. Id. at 41.  Irons notes that this claim “went far beyond the limits of partisan 
argument,” and thus could not be explained away as the actions of an advocate fulfilling his 
obligation to zealously represent his client.  Id. at 40-51. 
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The proverbial bottom line is that Korematsu was litigated 
and decided on the basis of a profoundly defective record.  This 
was no accident.  Key figures in the Justice Department and the 
Office of the Solicitor General deliberately suppressed crucial 
evidence.  The majority then compounded the situation by 
ignoring critical information actually before them.  That allowed 
Justice Black to chart the path he pursued, stressing supposed 
“real military dangers which were presented.”151  It was on that 
basis that he deferred to the government’s judgments.  That was 
an error, albeit dictated in some important respects by Fahy’s 
actions.  It was also almost certainly compounded by a desire to 
avoid difficult issues and a reluctance to accept the political and 
social risks posed by fashioning a contrary result. 
C. Country and Court: Reasonable Bases for Their Actions? 
The Court sustained the curfew orders in Hirabayashi and 
the internment program in Korematsu.  But the manner in which 
it did so is questionable both as a doctrinal and factual matter. 
Hirabayashi is justly celebrated as one of the cases in which 
“the Court poured the foundation of what we now call strict 
scrutiny for governmental racial classifications.”152  In his 
opinion for a nominally unanimous Court, Chief Justice Stone 
stressed that “[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of 
their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people 
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”153  
Such considerations were “in most circumstances irrelevant and 
therefore prohibited.”154  Their invocation was, nevertheless, 
entirely permissible if, as the Chief Justice postulated, the 
standard of review was deferential, asking only if “those charged 
 
151. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944). 
152. Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. 
REV. 933, 945 (2004).  For a contrary view in the light of Trump and the supposed 
repudiation of Korematsu, see Muller, Second Monster, supra note 48. 
153. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).  See also id. at 110 
(Murphy, J., concurring) (“[d]istinctions based on color and ancestry are utterly inconsistent 
with our traditions and ideals”).  Justice Murphy’s concurring opinion was originally a 
dissent. 
154. Id. at 100 (majority opinion). 
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with the responsibility for maintaining the national defense 
afforded a rational basis for the decision which they made.”155   
The question before the Court was not then whether the 
policy was fair.  “[I]t is not for any court to sit in review of the 
wisdom of [the government official’s] action or substitute its 
judgment for theirs.”156  Rather, the sole issue was whether, based 
on both the inherent nature of the War Power and the facts the 
Court credited, “the challenged orders and statute afforded a 
reasonable basis for the action taken in imposing the curfew.”157  
The prophylactic approach taken by the government was in turn 
appropriate under the circumstances.  Individualized assessment 
was, it maintained, not a viable option.  “[T]he peril [was] great 
and the time [was] short,” making “temporary treatment on a 
group basis . . . the only practicable expedient whatever the 
ultimate percentage of those who [might be] detained for 
cause.”158 
Three things are notable.   
First, the facts before the Court were both incomplete and 
misleading.  It was not formally informed of nor was it given the 
Ringle report or Ennis memorandum, which laid waste to 
virtually all of the government’s factual bases for race-based 
curfew orders.159  There was accordingly substantial reason to 
believe that General DeWitt did not act “in complete good faith” 
and that there was no foundation for his “firm conviction that [the 
specific curfew order] was required by considerations of public 
safety and military security.”160 
Second, the approach taken elided over substantial evidence 
actually in the record that the West Coast orders were infected by 
prejudice against a group repeatedly denounced as “Japs.”  Both 
the briefs and statements in the public domain by multiple actors 
should have prompted the Court to look with care at the actual 
justifications as opposed to those proffered.  It didn’t. 
 
155. Id. at 102. 
156. Id. at 93.  See also id. at 106 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“the wisdom or expediency 
of the decision which was made is not for us to review”). 
157. Id. at 101 (majority opinion). 
158. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 107 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
159. See supra section II.B. 
160. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 109 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
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Third, the Court actively avoided confronting issues posed 
by the details and implications of the West Coast exclusion 
orders.  It acknowledged that there were two counts in the 
indictment: one for knowing violation of the curfew order and one 
for knowing violation of the exclusion order.161  But it devoted all 
of its attention to the curfew and held that “[t]he conviction under 
the second count is without constitutional infirmity.”162  It then 
reasoned that since the sentences for each count were the same, 
and were to run concurrently, “we have no occasion to review the 
conviction on the first count.”163   
That was sheer sophistry.  The exclusion and internment 
orders and programs were not simply “somewhat more sweeping 
than a curfew regulation.”164  A requirement that individuals 
remain in their homes from 8:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. is arguably 
a minor inconvenience.165  Unless, of course, it is imposed only 
on one subset of the population that might conceivably pose 
security risks, at which point it is transformed into something 
entirely different.  Regardless, a mandate that anyone–much less 
only the Japanese–must leave their homes and be relocated and 
interned for the duration of the war in the functional equivalent of 
a “concentration camp” poses fundamental threats that are 
exponentially greater than a curfew.166  
More to the point, under the normal approach to adjudicating 
acts of civil disobedience the Court could have fashioned an 
opinion sustaining the conviction for knowing violation of the 
curfew and then taken the next logical step of declaring the 
measure itself unconstitutional.  Indeed, Justice Douglas 
acknowledged the viability of that approach, describing how a 
conscientious objector may first refuse to be inducted and then 
bring an action challenging the legality of his draft 
classification.167 
 
161. Id. at 83-84 (majority opinion). 
162. Id. at 105 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
163. Id. 
164. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 231 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
165. See id. at 218 (majority opinion). 
166. Justice Roberts invoked the label “concentration camp” in his dissent.  Id. at 225-
26 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (characterizing the issue as “not submitting to imprisonment in a 
concentration camp”); id. at 230 (characterizing War Relocation Centers as “a euphemism 
for concentration camps”). 
167. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 108 (1943) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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Instead, the Court opted to evaluate the curfew order in the 
light of its assessment of the situation and facts “[w]hen the orders 
were promulgated.”168  That made sense if the sole focus was 
whether there were realistic bases for fearing sabotage and 
espionage in the early months of 1942.  It defied reason if, as it 
should have, the Court assessed orders that remained in effect 
under the conditions that prevailed when it actually decided the 
case, when “[t]he tide of battle in the South Pacific had decisively 
turned” with “Japanese naval operations . . . increasingly 
concerned with evacuating troops as their positions grew 
hopeless.”169 
Korematsu is equally problematic.  Justice Black began his 
opinion with a ringing endorsement of the principle that “all legal 
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group 
are immediately suspect.”170  Such measures must be “subject[ed] 
. . . to the most rigid scrutiny” and while “[p]ressing public 
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such 
restrictions; racial antagonism never can.”171  Indeed, “[n]othing 
short of apprehension by the proper military authorities of the 
gravest imminent danger to the public safety can constitutionally 
justify either” the curfew or internment.172  
These are hallmarks of what we now know as strict scrutiny, 
a standard characterized as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”173  
As currently formulated, strict scrutiny articulates the test for all 
race-based government actions, requiring that they “must serve a 
compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored 
to further that interest.”174  That was certainly the doctrinal path 
Justice Black charted in the first part of his opinion.  Indeed, it 
 
168. Id. at 95 (majority opinion). 
169. IAN W. TOLL, THE CONQUERING TIDE: WAR IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS, 1942-
1944 234 (2015).  For details, see infra text accompanying notes 401-415. 
170. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 218. 
173. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrines on a Changing 
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
174. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).  See Adam 
Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the 
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800 (2006) (characterizing a “compelling interest” 
as “the most pressing circumstances” and “[n]arrow tailoring” as a requirement that the 
measure in question “reach no more activity (or less) than is necessary to advance those 
compelling ends.”). 
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was entirely consistent with his admonition four years earlier that 
our system of justice must be “free of prejudice, passion, 
excitement, and tyrannical power.”175  “Under our constitutional 
system,” he counseled, “courts stand against any winds that blow 
as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because 
they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-
conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement.”176   
If anyone was a victim of prejudice, public excitement, and 
government tyranny in 1942, it was the Japanese on the West 
Coast.  But Korematsu did not practice what it arguably preached.  
Having sounded the trumpet of “most rigid scrutiny,” Justice 
Black quickly reverted to a measure of deference totally 
inconsistent with that standard.  The Court could not, he declared, 
“reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and 
of Congress that there were disloyal members of [the Japanese] 
population.”177  Yes it damn well could, if in fact it honored what 
it now routinely describes as its self-imposed obligation to 
“‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the 
[government] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use 
of a highly suspect tool.”178  That would especially pertain where, 
as was the case in Korematsu, the only evidence before the Court 
was the possibility “of disloyalty on the part of some.”179 
If Hirabayashi lacked details about the race-based 
motivations for the West Coast curfew orders, the same cannot be 
said of Korematsu.  The dissenting Justices laid out in chilling 
detail General DeWitt’s true motivations.  Justice Murphy, for 
example, took direct notice of DeWitt’s statements that “all 
individuals of Japanese descent [are] ‘subversive’” and belong “to 
‘an enemy race’ whose ‘racial strains are undiluted.’”180  The 
government actions, he and his fellow dissenters stressed, meant 
 
175. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237 (1940). 
176. Id. at 241.  The focus was on “[t]yrannical governments” and their treatment of 
“helpless political, religious, or racial minorities,” not on ethnicity or national origin.  Id. at 
236.   
177. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
178. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
179. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.  Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334, 337 
(2003) (emphasizing that strict scrutiny requires “truly individualized consideration” and that 
narrow tailoring, in particular, requires “a highly individualized, holistic review of each 
[person’s situation]”). 
180. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 236 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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that “[t]he difference between” Germans and Italians and “[Fred 
Korematsu’s] crime . . . result[ed], not from anything 
[Korematsu] did, said, or thought, different than they, but only in 
that he was born of different racial stock.”181  As such, the 
internment program “falls into the ugly abyss of racism.”182 
The majority took umbrage, stating that “[t]o cast this case 
into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real 
military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the 
issue.”183  Not really.  Rather, if properly undertaken, strict 
scrutiny required the Court to assess the use of a highly suspect 
criterion in the light of the evidence that actually supported its 
invocation.  And that is precisely what the majority refused to do.   
This may have reflected willful blindness, simple patriotism, 
or latent racism.  It certainly contradicted an earlier declaration 
by Justice Black in Ex parte Kawato, where he observed that 
“[t]he policy of severity toward alien enemies was clearly 
impossible for a country whose lifeblood came from an 
immigrant stream.”184  But that sentiment was directed, ironically, 
against private prejudice, and was qualified by the subsequent 
declaration that “the Government . . . is vested with the power to 
protect all the people . . . from possible injury by disloyal 
aliens.”185  That, at least in theory, was the goal in Hirabayashi 
and Korematsu, albeit one marred by wartime hysteria and at least 
tacit, if not admitted, prejudice against the Japanese. 
It was also consistent with the Court’s prior record.  It had 
consistently displayed a pronounced antipathy toward 
individuals–citizens or otherwise – of Japanese and Chinese 
ancestry, even as it embraced and protected other national and 
ethnic groups, especially those of European heritage.186   
During and in the immediate aftermath of World War I, for 
example, vicious stereotypes dominated American thinking about 
 
181. Id. at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
182. Id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
183. Id. at 223. 
184. 317 U.S. 69, 73 (1942). 
185. Id. at 74. 
186. See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 694 (1898) (“To hold 
that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution excludes from citizenship the children, 
born in the United States, of citizens or subjects of other countries, would be to deny 
citizenship to thousands of persons of English, Scotch, Irish, German or other European 
parentage, who have always been considered and treated as citizens of the United States.”). 
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Germans and Germany.  A group called the American Defense 
Society, for example, declared that Germans were “the most 
treacherous, brutal and loathsome nation on earth” and that “[t]he 
sound of the German language . . . reminds us of the murder of a 
million helpless old men, unarmed men, women, and children; 
and the driving of about 100,000 young French, Belgian, and 
Polish women into compulsory prostitution.”187   
The post-war Court was nevertheless willing to repudiate 
anti-German sentiments fueled by “[u]nfortunate experiences 
during [World War I] and aversion toward every characteristic of 
truculent adversaries.”188  Alarmed by what the Nebraska 
Supreme Court characterized as “local foci of alien enemy 
sentiment[s],” and seeking to foster the “upbuilding of an 
intelligent American citizenship,”189 at least eight states passed 
measures in 1919 forbidding the “teach[ing of] any subject to any 
person in any language [other] than the English language.”190  
This and a similar ban were challenged by individuals who had 
been convicted of “unlawfully [teaching] the subject of reading in 
the German language.”191 
The Court conceded that the states had the power to 
“improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and 
morally.”192  It stressed, however, that “no adequate reason” for 
the proscription “in time of peace and domestic tranquility has 
been shown.”193  It also rejected the state’s contention that “[a] 
danger exists; of sufficient magnitude” to sustain the statute,194 
stressing that the “[m]ere knowledge of the German language 
cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful.”195   
That tolerance was not extended to individuals from China 
and Japan.  In Chae Chan Ping v. United States, for example, 
Justice Stephen J. Field stated that it was entirely appropriate to 
 
187. Personal Justice Denied, supra note 75, at 291 (alterations adopted). 
188. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923). 
189. Nebraska Dist. of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 175 N.W. 531, 533-
34 (Neb. 1919). 
190. Id. at 532 (quoting 1919 Neb. Laws, Ch. 249, p. 1019). 
191. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396 (1923).  See also Bartels v. Iowa, 290 U.S. 
404, 409 (1923). 
192. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. 
193. Id. at 402.   
194. Id. at 394 (Argument for Defendant in Error). 
195. Id. at 400. 
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exclude “particular classes of persons, whose presence is deemed 
injurious or a source of danger to the country.”196  That initially 
meant the Chinese, who, Field previously declared, “cannot 
assimilate with our people, but continue a distinct race amongst 
us.”197  In a similar vein, Justice Horace Gray castigated groups 
that were “apparently incapable of assimilating with our people, 
might endanger good order, and be injurious to the public 
interests.”198   
The Japanese were initially the beneficiaries of various 
treatises and statutes that acknowledged the right of Japanese 
citizens “to enter, travel or reside” in the United States.199  The 
Court recognized that such measures were constitutional, but also 
emphasized that the same principles supporting their passage 
included the undoubted right to “exclude aliens of a particular 
race from the United States.”200  In 1903, the Court recognized 
that the Japanese did not have “by the treaty . . . full liberty to 
enter or reside in the United States.”201  Then, in the wake of a 
1906 statute designed to provide “a uniform rule for 
naturalization,”202 it held that the class of “free white persons” 
eligible for entry did not include the Japanese, even as it denied 
that its holding “implied–either in the legislation or in our 
 
196. 130 U.S. 581, 608 (1889). 
197. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 568 (1884) (Field, J. dissenting). 
198. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 717 (1893). 
199. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 96 (1903) (quoting Treaty of 
Commerce and Navigation of 1894,  Japan-U.S., Nov. 23, 1894, 29 Stat. 848).  The first case 
focusing on individuals from Japan was Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, which–anticipating 
an initiative undertaken by the Trump administration–recognized the power to exclude aliens 
“‘likely to become a public charge.’”  142 U.S. 651, 662 (1892).  This principle was invoked 
by the Trump administration as an element in its war on immigration.  Cf. CASA de 
Maryland, Inc. v. Trump, 971 F.3d 220, 263 (4th Cir. 2020) (sustaining DHS rule to that 
effect), with New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 969 F.3d 42, 86 (2nd Cir. 2020) 
(rule inconsistent with immigration law and likely arbitrary and capricious). 
200. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. at 97.  
201. Id. 
202. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 180 (1922).  See generally, Pub. L. No. 
59-338, 34 Stat. 596, ch. 3592.  That act was bolstered by the Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. 
L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153, ch. 190, which continued a trend on enshrining “race-based 
nativism.”  Mae M. Ngai, The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A 
Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924, 86  J. AM. HIST. 67, 69 (1999).  As Ngai 
stresses, “[t]he racialization of [groups like the Chinese and Japanese] rendered them 
unalterably foreign and unassimilable to the nation.”  Id. at 70. 
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interpretation of it–any suggestion of individual unworthiness or 
racial inferiority.”203 
These decisions and statutes made two things abundantly 
clear.  First, that “some years’ experience” had established that 
the Chinese and Japanese were to be regarded as aliens in the 
worst possible sense of the term:  individuals who “tenaciously 
adher[e] to the customs and usages of their own country” and are 
“incapable of assimilating with our people.”204  Those 
conclusions were drawn in spite of “studies . . . suggest[ing] that 
the integration of Italians and Germans,” for a telling example, 
“is even slower than that of the Japanese.”205  The Court in 
particular indicated that it was willing to recognize a robust 
federal power to control immigration and make judgments that 
should not be second-guessed about who should be admitted to 
the United States and under what terms and conditions. 
The government did not rely on these cases in either 
Hirabayashi or Korematsu.  It did cite one, Ozawa, but only for 
the proposition that “Japanese who were born abroad . . . are . . . 
ineligible for citizenship.”206  They were not part of the formal 
record and neither opinion overtly relied on them or the anti-
Chinese and Japanese sentiments they expressed.  I cannot 
accordingly prove that they provided a determinative matrix for 
the Court as it deliberated.  But it defies imagination that the 
Justices were not aware of them, the powers they affirmed, and 
the sentiments they expressed. 
III.  STRICT SCRUTINY? 
The core of my argument is simple: the bench, bar, and 
academy have an obligation to keep the Japanese Exclusion cases 
in the canon, in particular Korematsu, for two reasons.   
The first is arguably a negative: the extent to which 
Korematsu is an object lesson in bad faith, both on the part of the 
government and the Court itself.  There is much to be learned 
from the actual record of the case and details that shed light on 
what happened and why.  This is consistent with something I have 
 
203. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 192, 198.  
204. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 717 (1893). 
205. Freeman, supra note 53, at 446.   
206. Hirabayashi Brief, supra note 119, at 22. 
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long believed and practiced:  the obligation to teach exemplars of 
the lawyer’s craft and moral obligations, with a special emphasis 
on how not to litigate cases or practice law.207   
The second is the extent to which these cases provide the 
foundations for the doctrine of strict scrutiny as applied to group 
classifications.  That mode of analysis is central to our current 
understanding of the nature and impact of the equal protection 
guarantee.  It is also an analytic standard most critics of 
Korematsu celebrate and embrace, albeit not all.208 
The phrase “strict scrutiny” in the sense we now use it first 
appeared in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, Attorney 
General, where the Court struck down an Oklahoma measure 
authorizing forced sterilization of any individual “convicted two 
or more times for crimes ‘amounting to felonies involving moral 
turpitude.’”209  The majority conceded that prior cases established 
“that the claim that . . . legislation violates the equal protection 
clause . . . is ‘the usual last resort of constitutional arguments.’”210  
It emphasized, however, that the statute in question “involves one 
of the basic civil rights of man” and that if applied to Skinner 
“[h]e is forever deprived of a basic liberty.”211  Deference was not 
appropriate.  Rather, “strict scrutiny of the classification which a 
State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly, or 
otherwise, invidious discriminations are made against groups or 
types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of 
just and equal laws.”212 
Skinner made only a passing reference to the case routinely 
cited for initiating the move toward strict scrutiny, United States 
v. Carolene Products Company.213  Footnote 4 in that decision 
postulated the occasional need for “more exacting judicial 
 
207. It also, in what is now thankfully a post-Donald J. Trump era, reminds us of the 
importance of being able to believe that the government embraces and pursues ideals this 
nation supposedly stands for. 
208. See infra at text accompanying notes 243-50 for my discussion of the views of 
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209. 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942). 
210. Id. at 539 (citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927)). 
211. Id. at 541. 
212. Id. 
213. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 544 (Stone, C.J., 
concurring) (citing Carolene Products for the proposition that “[t]here are limits to the extent 
to which the presumption of constitutionality can be pressed, especially where the liberty of 
the person is concerned.”).   
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scrutiny” when government actions risk depriving certain rights 
or treating certain groups differently.214  As Jack Balkin has 
instructed, this has particular salience for the Japanese Exclusion 
Cases, anticipating as it does a political and social order that will 
“break open the hermetic seal and allow the minority to spread 
into the inside, to make the outsider an insider, to put the excluded 
group in the place it would have enjoyed had it been counted an 
insider all along.”215  At the same time, Jack reminds us that we 
must be ever aware of a fact of modern American life that has 
particular salience in these troubled and troubling times:  the 
reality of “dominant economic and social forces” that have 
“combine[d] to perpetuate an economic underclass,” and “create 
minority subcultures that feature poverty, lack of education, 
learned helplessness, and self-destructive behavior.”216 
 Skinner was the first in a sequence of cases that began to 
give Balkin’s promise meaning.  Hirabayashi and Korematsu 
became key steps in that process, albeit cases that did not actually 
employ heightened scrutiny.  Hirabayashi started a labeling 
regime, characterizing “[d]istinctions between [individuals] 
solely because of their ancestry” as being “by their very nature 
odious.”217  In particular, it stressed that such classifications were 
“in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited.”218  It 
was in this sense that it “poured the foundation of what we now 
call strict scrutiny for governmental racial classifications.”219  
Korematsu provided further structure and detail.  Race-based 
classifications are “immediately suspect” and must be 
“subject[ed] . . . to the most rigid scrutiny.”220  Narrow tailoring 
was not mentioned, but was anticipated in the Court’s emphasis 
on the notion that “the need for action was great, and time was 
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short.”221  This was in effect a declaration that the exclusion order 
was what the Court now describes as “the least restrictive 
alternative that can be used to achieve [its] goal,”222 an approach 
requiring the government to demonstrate that there is no way to 
achieve what it seeks without using the suspect criterion or 
burdening the right at issue. 
In their wake, both Korematsu and Hirabayashi were 
routinely cited and quoted with approval.  Two threads emerged.  
The first was a retreat from reflexive disparate treatment of aliens.  
The second was the gradual embrace of a formal test. 
In January 1948, in a decision striking down California’s 
Alien Land Law, Hirabayashi was invoked as an exemplar of “a 
general rule” that “[d]istinctions between citizens solely because 
of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people 
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”223  
The holding was narrow.  The majority disclaimed any need to 
determine whether “the Alien Land Law denies ineligible aliens 
the equal protection of the laws,”224 a result that condemned the 
act as applied to Fred Oyama but, as Randall Kennedy has 
observed, “ha[d] no broader educative force.”225  That limitation 
was contested by both Justices Black and Murphy,226 with 
Murphy in particular expanding on his earlier statements in 
Hirabayashi and Korematsu in a lengthy discussion that “brings 
home to a reader the moral and legal importance of the matter at 
stake.”227 
All three of the Exclusion Cases were then cited that same 
Term as exemplars of an evolving “national policy against racial 
 
221. Id. at 223-24. 
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discrimination.”228  In a similar vein, the Court then quoted 
Hirabayashi and cited Korematsu for “the assumption that ‘racial 
discriminations are in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore 
prohibited.’”229   
The process was uneven.  The Court avoided the issue when 
it invalidated a measure “barring issuance of commercial fishing 
licenses to persons ineligible for citizenship under federal law.”230  
Rather than resolve the question of whether the measure was 
intentionally discriminatory, the majority held that it violated “a 
general policy that all persons lawfully in this country shall abide 
‘in any state’ on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens 
under non-discriminatory laws.”231   
The Court also hedged its bets when either national security 
or the military were involved.  In United States ex rel. Knauff v. 
Shaughnessy, for example, the Court held that it had “no 
authority” to review exclusion of alien denied admission during a 
national emergency.232 Justice Jackson, in turn, citing Korematsu, 
stressed that “when the military steps in, the court takes a less 
liberal view of the rights of the individual and sustains most 
arbitrary exercises of military power.”233   
The second strand, formal articulation of what we now know 
as strict scrutiny, began with Bolling v. Sharpe, where, citing both 
Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the Court stated that 
“[c]lassifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with 
particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence 
constitutionally suspect.”234  Deviations from that general rule 
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were to be allowed only “on a showing of ‘the gravest imminent 
danger to the public safety.’”235  This “strong policy” was in 
accord with “the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment 
[which] was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from 
official sources in the States.”236  The Court characterized racial 
classifications as “‘constitutionally suspect’” and emphasized 
that they were “subject to the ‘most rigid scrutiny.’”237  Notably, 
as it stressed in Loving v. Virginia, Korematsu, in particular, stood 
for the proposition that “[a]t the very least, the Equal Protection 
Clause demands that racial classifications . . . be subjected to the 
‘most rigid scrutiny.’”238  The net effect, as described by the 
second Justice Harlan, was a “rule that statutory classifications 
which either are based upon certain ‘suspect’ criteria or affect 
‘fundamental rights’ will be held to deny equal protection unless 
justified by a ‘compelling’ governmental interest.”239 
This trend continued, with the Court invoking various 
elements and terms as it embraced the rule that “equal protection 
analysis requires strict scrutiny . . . when the classification 
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right 
or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.”240  If 
that is the case, the measure survives only if it is “narrowly 
tailored to further compelling governmental interests.”241   
The current Court insists that this is the operative rule.  Chief 
Justice Roberts, for example, recently stressed that: 
[b]ecause the Montana Supreme Court applied the no-aid 
provision to discriminate against schools and parents based 
on the religious character of the school, the “strictest 
scrutiny” is required.  That “stringent standard” is not 
“watered down but really means what it says,” . . . .  To 
satisfy it, government action “must advance ‘interests of the 
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highest order’ and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of 
those interests.”242   
But the Court has also fashioned results that have led 
thoughtful individuals to ask powerful questions about whether 
the strict scrutiny regime remains truly meaningful.  Michael 
Klarman has argued that true strict scrutiny enjoyed only a limited 
run, noting retrenchment regarding the articulation and/or 
protection of fundamental rights by the Burger Court and issues 
posed by state action decisions and the insistence that equal 
protection and due process claims require intentional government 
actions.243  Jack Balkin, in turn, has identified important problems 
posed by an “all-or-nothing regime of strict and rational basis 
scrutiny” that has “subverted the principles underlying the equal 
protection clause.”244   
They have a point.  Jack, for example, is spot on when he 
argues that the recent (and likely future) affirmative action and 
diversity decisions have fashioned “bizarre result[s]” that subvert 
our ability to “offer a useful corrective” that would “integrate 
citizens from diverse backgrounds and ensure that important 
educational and employment opportunities are open to all groups 
in society.”245  Thus, while the Court emphasizes that “[c]ontext 
matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under 
the Equal Protection Clause,”246 that has not meant that the 
 
242. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2260 (2020) (citations 
omitted).  See also Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2502 (2019) (“[i]f district 
lines were drawn for the purpose of separating racial groups, then they are subject to strict 
scrutiny because ‘race-based decisionmaking is inherently suspect.’”) (quoting Miller v. 
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995)); Nat’l Inst. of Fam. and Life Advoc.’s v. Becerra, 138 
S. Ct. 2361, 2374 (2018) (invoking strict scrutiny where laws restricting speech are content-
based); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1734 
(2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“we know this with certainty: when the government fails 
to act neutrally toward the free exercise of religion, it tends to run into trouble. Then the 
government can prevail only if it satisfies strict scrutiny, showing that its restrictions on 
religion both serve a compelling interest and are narrowly tailored.”) (citing Church of 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993)). 
243. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 
90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 285-99 (1991) (discussing the “Demise of the Fundamental Rights 
Strand of Equal Protection”); but see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL 
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 196 (2004) 
(positive characterization of the Carolene Products regime as one that counters “democratic 
procedures” that are susceptible “to systematic malfunction”). 
244. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 235 (2011). 
245. Id. at 234. 
246. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003). 
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analytic regime is adjusted when policies favor “the children of 
Wall Street investment bankers” to the detriment of “African 
Americans or Latinos.”247  We are told that “[r]elevant 
differences” may be taken “into account.”248  Further, we are 
admonished that “[s]trict scrutiny must not be ‘strict in theory but 
fatal in fact.’”249  Nevertheless, policies designed to assist groups 
that have been the victims of invidious discrimination may still 
survive the rigors of strict scrutiny, even when, as Justice 
Anthony Kennedy has recognized, key “evidentiary gap[s]” mean 
that “th[ese] case[s] ha[ve] been litigated on a somewhat artificial 
basis . . . [that] may limit [their] value for prospective 
guidance.”250 
This is neither the time nor place to explore the full 
ramifications of these concerns, especially when the focus is on 
results and the normative concern associated with them.  For my 
purposes, it is enough to note that the Court insists that strict 
scrutiny remains an essential analytic tool and, when explaining 
its origins, has consistently cited Korematsu and Hirabayashi 
with approval.251   
This does not mean that we should not examine each of the 
Japanese Exclusion Cases with care and acknowledge their flaws, 
taking into account what was said and done and why.  The actual 
 
247. Balkin, supra note 244, at 234.   
248. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005).  See also Winkler, supra note 
174, at 870 (“[s]trict scrutiny review is institutionally sensitive” and its results vary 
depending on the “underlying context”). 
249. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin., 570 U.S. 297, 314 (2013) (quoting 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)) (Fisher I); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
250. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2209 (2016) (Fisher II).  
The most recent, and potentially most important decision, nevertheless held that classic strict 
scrutiny provided the operative standard.  See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President 
and Fellows of Harvard College, 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed (Feb. 
25, 2021) (20-1199).  The First Circuit held that the Harvard plan survived strict scrutiny.  
Id. at 184-88.  The general consensus is that it will be taken up by the Court, perhaps 
providing the opportunity for the post-Kennedy Court to hold that such programs are in fact 
unconstitutional. 
251. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (“classifications 
based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore be 
subjected to close judicial scrutiny.”); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) 
(“classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently 
suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that “at least since Korematsu v. United States,” racial 
classifications have “been regarded as inherently ‘suspect’”). 
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policies and practices sanctioned in Hirabayashi and Korematsu 
must be condemned.  Their implicit repudiation in Endo should, 
in turn, be acknowledged and applauded, signaling as it did an 
underlying premise that became part of the constitutional canon.  
Endo was not perfect and should be treated with caution.  
Justice Douglas did emphasize that “[l]oyalty is a matter of the 
heart and mind, not of race, creed, or color.”252  But he also waged 
a largely unconvincing battle to characterize the underlying 
statutes and orders as having but a “single aim . . . the protection 
of the war effort against espionage and sabotage.”253  That, Justice 
Murphy stressed, ignored the “racism inherent in the entire 
evacuation program.”254  As such, the approach taken by the 
majority did not embody the promise of strict scrutiny, which it 
acknowledged only in passing, stating that there is a “narrower 
scope for the operation of the presumption of constitutionality 
when legislation . . . violate[s] a specific [constitutional] 
prohibition.”255   
The majority opinion in Trump has the arguable virtue of not 
pretending that it has anything to do with heightened scrutiny.  
Right or wrong, the Court rejected the “request for a searching 
inquiry into the persuasiveness of the President’s justifications,” 
arguing that that would be “inconsistent with the broad statutory 
text and the deference traditionally accorded [to] the President in 
this sphere.”256  It also refused to apply a sequence of cases 
characterized as standing for the proposition that in certain 
instances the Court should invoke what is characterized as 
“rational basis with bite,” stressing that the “common thread” in 
those decisions has been the absence of “any purpose other than 
a ‘bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group.’”257  
Chief Justice Roberts declared that “[t]he Proclamation does not 
fit this pattern.”258  
In each of the three cases on which plaintiffs and the dissent 
relied, he observed, the measures in question were clearly 
 
252. 323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944). 
253. Id. at 300. 
254. Id. at 307 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
255. Id. at 299 (majority opinion). 
256. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2409 (2018). 
257. Id. at 2420 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
258. Id.  
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predicated on undeniably illegitimate motives.  In Moreno, an 
admittedly sparse legislative record nevertheless supported the 
contention that the sole intent of the measure was “to prevent so-
called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from participating in the 
food stamp program.”259  Focusing on the express purpose of the 
food stamp program, the Court determined that “the challenged  
. . . classification . . . is clearly irrelevant” for a program whose 
avowed goal is to allow participants “to stimulate the agricultural 
economy by purchasing farm surpluses, or with their personal 
nutritional requirements.”260  Given that the sole evident purpose 
of the measure at issue was to prevent “hippies” from 
participating in the program, the conclusion was inescapable that 
“if the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ 
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare 
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot 
constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”261 
In City of Cleburne and Romer, in turn, the Court found that 
“irrational prejudice” and “animus,” respectively, were clear 
predicates for actions that targeted citizens with mental 
retardation and gays and lesbians.262  In Cleburne, the Court 
meticulously examined the rationales for the city’s decision and 
found, correctly, that each of the avowed concerns applied with 
equal or greater force to other group living arrangements.263  In 
Romer, in turn, the constitutional “amendment withdraws from 
homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection[s] from the 
injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of 
these laws and policies.”264  As such, it was a “status-based 
enactment” that had a “primary rationale” of giving legal force to 
“personal or religious objections to homosexuality.”265  
 
259. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534. 
260. Id. (quoting Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 313 (1972)). 
261. Id. 
262. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985); Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
263. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448-50.  I actually find it quite hard to take Cleburne 
seriously.  If, for example, we are to use the fact that statutes have been passed that protect 
individuals from discrimination on the basis of disability as a reason for not affording them 
heightened judicial scrutiny, what follows for discrimination on the basis of race or gender, 
given the myriad laws, regulations, and policies that bar their mistreatment? 
264. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627. 
265. Id. at 635. 
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The common thread in the three decisions was a set of 
policies that, as actually written and applied, gave force to a “bare 
. . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”266  That is 
certainly one way to view the Trump Proclamation, if one reads 
terms into it that are actually not present and treats pre-election 
statements and sentiments by a political candidate as dispositive 
of subsequent presidential intent.  A majority of the Court 
concluded that this was not appropriate.  I am troubled by this, 
but understand it.  For me at least, the more important 
consideration is that even if we credit the presence of a group-
based implementation goal, the record before the Court did 
document both text and evidence that supported the belief that the 
Proclamation was “expressly premised on” additional “legitimate 
purposes: preventing entry of nationals who cannot be adequately 
vetted and inducing other nations to improve their practices.”267   
Was this correct?  In particular, how do we deal with difficult 
questions of actual intent when assessing a facially neutral policy 
that was “first advertised openly and unequivocally as a ‘total and 
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States’” and, 
in Justice Sotomayor’s estimation, “now masquerades behind a 
facade of national-security concerns.”268  For the Chief Justice, 
this posed questions about the “significance” of pre-inauguration 
statements and the “sincerity of the stated justifications for the 
policy [promulgated] by reference to extrinsic statements.”269  
Justice Sotomayor, in turn, concluded that “a reasonable observer 
would conclude that the Proclamation was driven primarily by 
anti-Muslim animus, rather than by the Government’s asserted 
national-security justifications.”270 
Which is it?  I will hazard some guesses shortly.  That said, 
my focus so far has been on the development of doctrine, rather 
than the results in given cases.  Viewed in that light, there is much 
to be said for Korematsu’s place in the constitutional order.  
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg–who joined the Sotomayor dissent 
in Trump–might well have come to question her prior conclusion 
 
266. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) (alterations included). 
267. Id. at 2421. 
268. Id. at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
269. Id. at 2417-18 (majority opinion). 
270. Id. at 2438 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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that “[a] Korematsu-type classification . . . will never again 
survive [strict] scrutiny.”271  For her, the “enduring lesson” of 
Korematsu was that strict scrutiny should be viewed as “‘fatal’ 
for classifications burdening groups that have suffered 
discrimination in our society.”272  Emphasizing that the Court 
“has dispelled the notion that ‘strict scrutiny’ is ‘fatal in fact,’” 
she focused on the need to “ferret out classifications [that] in 
reality malign, but masquerad[e] as benign.”273   
It may well be that as both a matter of design and result, we 
will find that Proclamation 9645 was indeed malign, if and when 
key aspects of its development, text, and implementation are 
actively and fully litigated.  Then again, perhaps not.  What I 
know at this point is that the results in Hirabayashi and 
Korematsu were clearly intolerable.  Both opinions made implicit 
promises about the need to reject race and national origin as the 
bases for policy decisions.  Neither did so, opting instead for a 
deferential approach that allowed biased actors to give full vent 
to their prejudices.  It is then entirely appropriate to treat them, as 
the post-Trump Court now does, as “egregiously wrong when 
decided.”274  But as Justice Robert Jackson stressed at the time 
Korematsu was decided, albeit not in an opinion for the Court, 
“[t]o overrule an important precedent is serious business . . . 
call[ing] for sober appraisal of the disadvantages of the 
innovation as well as those of the questioned case, a weighing of 
practical effects of one against the other.”275   
This requires that we look with care at what Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh recently characterized as the full range of “real-world 
consequences.”276  The Exclusion Cases have clearly had 
profound “effects on the citizenry . . . [and] on the law and the 
legal system.”277  Those are not, however, limited to the egregious 
treatment of an inappropriately targeted group that, by and large, 
posed no credible threat to the security of the nation.  Rather, the 
 




274. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1415 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
275. Robert H. Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 334, 
334 (1944). 
276. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1416 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
277. Id. at 1415. 
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decisions played an important role in the explanation of the 
reasons for and development of constitutional principles that lie 
at the heart of our current conceptions of the rule of law.  We can 
and likely will quibble about the impact and efficacy of strict 
scrutiny in today’s complex legal system.  We cannot and should 
not forget the role it has played in a regime within which 
disfavored groups and important rights have been protected.  It is 
that precept I embrace. 
 
   IV.  CASES THAT PASS IN THE NIGHT 
As I noted at the outset, I believe Justice Sotomayor 
oversimplified matters when she concluded that there are “stark 
parallels between the reasoning of [Trump] and that of 
Korematsu.”278  I repeat:  I suspect I am in a distinct minority 
within the academy in believing that a respectable argument can 
be made that, by the third iteration of the Trump immigration 
order, the adults in the room had purged the actual policy–and 
hopefully its implementation–of the childish promises that 
Candidate Trump made as he pandered to his base.  Indeed, if 
Rudolf Giuliani is to be believed–a sentiment that conjures up 
images of wishes, horses, and beggars–that transition was 
prompted by recommendations made by a “commission” 
empaneled to find a way to “do it legally.”279 
This is a difficult road to travel.  The developmental line 
most observers pursue confines itself to an account shaped by 
Trump’s pledge on December 7, 2015 that he was “calling for a 
total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United 
States,” followed by his snarky aside when the initial order, silent 
on its face as to religion, was issued in January, 2017: “We all 
know what that means.”280  Critics note, but do not credit, that as 
the “campaign progressed, [Trump] began to describe his policy 
proposal in different terms,” changing it from a “‘Muslim ban’” 
to an initiative at least arguably based on security, “an extreme 
 
278. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2447 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
279. Amy B. Wang, Trump Asked for a ‘Muslim Ban,’ Giuliani Says–and Ordered a 
Commission to do it ‘Legally’, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc/EE26-M7XJ]. 
280. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2435-36 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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vetting from certain areas of the world.”281  Contrary statements 
by Trump, and the express terms of the various orders, are 
accordingly treated as “prox[ies]” for invidious bias that no 
“reasonable” observer could possibly credit.282 
So, do we know what the Proclamation “means”?  Especially 
since after all this time we still do not know exactly how it has 
operated and what its actual impact has been on immigration in 
general and, in particular, preventing terrorism and entry by 
Muslims. 
A.  “We All Know What That Means”? 
Muslim ban?  Or terrorist interdiction?   
Opponents of the ban focus intently on statements Donald 
Trump made from the time he announced his candidacy through 
his early days in office.  Trump has not helped matters.  During 
the campaign, he tried to repackage his initial promise to enact a 
Muslim ban into one that would simply suspend “immigration 
from certain areas of the world where there’s a proven history of 
terrorism against the United States, Europe or our allies until we 
fully understand how to end these threats.”283  But in that same 
speech he morphed back into his anti-Muslim persona, stating that 
it was necessary “to stop ‘importing radical Islamic terrorism to 
the West through a failed immigration system.’”284  He continued 
in this vein after taking office, making both the occasional 
inflammatory statement and, more frequently, issuing his beloved 
tweets, characterizing the measures promulgated as “watered 
down version[s] of the [original Travel Ban]” and declaring–
much as the proponents of Japanese exclusion did in 1942–that 
“it is ‘very hard’ for Muslims to assimilate into Western 
culture.”285  
What then are we to make of Proclamation 9645 itself?  It 
speaks directly and solely of the need to “detect foreign nationals 
 
281. Id. at 2436 (alterations adopted). 
282. See, e.g., International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 373 F. Supp. 3d 650, 
655 (D. Md. 2019); Arab Am. Civ. Rts. League v. Trump, 399 F. Supp. 3d 717, 729 (E.D. 
Mich. 2019). 
283. Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 12, Hawaii v. 
Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (D. Haw. 2017) (Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-00050-DKW-KSC). 
284. Id. 
285. Id. at 20 (internal quotations omitted).  
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who may commit, aid, or support acts of terrorism, or otherwise 
pose a safety threat and . . . aid our efforts to prevent such 
individuals from entering the United States.”286  The focus is on 
“foreign nationals,” not Muslims.  Their admissibility in turn is 
tied to the “[i]nformation-sharing and identity-management 
protocols and practices of foreign governments” that “manage the 
identity and travel documents of their nationals and residents.”287  
Neither religion, race, nor national origin are mentioned.  Rather, 
the ban is to prevent “the entry of nationals of . . . countries found 
to be ‘inadequate’ with respect to” three “baseline” screening 
criteria,288  namely “[i]dentity-management information,” 
“[n]ational security and public-safety information,” and 
“[n]ational security and public-safety risk assessment.”289   
The obvious complicating factor, and point of emphasis in 
the litigation, is that “most of the countries covered by the 
Proclamation have Muslim-majority populations.”290  The Court 
acknowledged this but tried to minimize its significance when it 
stressed that “the policy covers just 8% of the world’s Muslim 
population and,” more tellingly, “is limited to countries that were 
previously designated by Congress or prior administrations as 
posing national security risks.”291 
   It is certainly possible that a policy reaching only a very 
distinct minority of its supposed target group is grossly 
underinclusive.  That poses no constitutional problems if the 
standard of review is rational basis, given that there is “no 
freestanding ‘underinclusiveness limitation’” and government 
“need not address all aspects of a problem in one fell swoop” and  
“may focus on their most pressing concerns.”292  It becomes much 
more troubling if, as many parties assert, heightened scrutiny is 
required. 
The Obama-era origins of the list, in turn, raise multiple 
interesting questions.  Is the mere identity of the nations 
dispositive?  That did not seem to be a terribly great concern when 
 
286. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,162 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
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288. Id. at 45,164. 
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both the prior administration and Congress enacted the visa 
waiver provisions noted by the Court.293  Some critics argued at 
the time that the restrictions “targeted . . . primarily those from 
Muslim-majority countries in the name of national security.”294  
But they also stressed, in an observation that severely undermines 
the logic of the Trump administration’s supposedly clever 
decision, that since “none of the terrorist attacks carried out in the 
U.S. were executed by citizens of these nations . . . the countries 
pinpointed in the Act and Order appear to be irrelevant based on 
historical data.”295  Proclamation 9645 actually attempted to cure 
some of these problems, identifying specific concerns about the 
extent to which specific nations either harbored terrorist groups 
or fostered their activities.296 
The most telling complaint was that the prior measures 
risked placing “a bipartisan imprimatur to claims of extremely 
broad executive power,” bolstered by “excessive deference from 
the judiciary.”297  As Professors Rodríguez and Cox observed, 
albeit focusing largely on a different aspect of the Obama record, 
“Presidential immigration law is ascendent.”298  The reality is that 
the current political environment is one within which “Congress” 
appears to have “no discernible priorities.”299  The current 
controversies may well reflect the hope that the “freedom” to act 
the President now seems to enjoy is accompanied by 
“accountability and constraint” brought about by “public and 
congressional pressure.”300  Then again, it may simply be an 
example of unfortunate chickens come home to roost.  Especially 
if we keep in mind that “despite Trump’s repeated warnings that 
 
293. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2421 (noting the passage of the Visa Waiver Program and 
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299. Id. at 104. 
300. Id. at 225. 
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he planned to expel more than one million unauthorized 
immigrants, he has not reached the numbers achieved by 
President Obama, whose administration expelled over three 
million people and holds the record for formal deportations in a 
year–more than 432,000 in 2013.”301  As one recent account 
stressed, “the Obama administration’s actions were not sadistic.  
But it doesn’t mean they weren’t harmful.”302 
The heart of the matter is deceptively simple.  Is the 
September 2017 Proclamation, as one District Court held on 
remand, tainted by “the subjective intent of the President and his 
advisors,”303 such that it “was motivated only by an illegitimate 
hostility to Muslims”?304  Or is it at least “possible”–as the Court 
of Appeals subsequently found–if not actually dictated as a matter 
of law under the proper standard of review, “to ‘discern a 
relationship’ between the Proclamation’s entry restrictions and 
‘legitimate state interests,’ such that the Proclamation is not 
‘inexplicable by anything but animus’”?305  In particular, what is 
the proper conclusion when Trump was decided with an 
incomplete record pursuant to a standard of review that asks only 
if “there are plausible reasons for the government’s action[s].”306 
 
301. Julia Preston, Deportation Nation, N.Y. REV. (Oct. 8, 2020) 
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Opponents of the ban argue that facial neutrality does not 
matter, taking comfort in the admonition that there is “no 
neutrality when the government’s ostensible object is to take 
sides.”307  They maintain that “[n]o reasonable observer could 
swallow the claim that” the President “ha[s] cast off the objective 
so unmistakable in” his prior statements.308  They also contend 
that lower courts have uniformly agreed, with “every federal 
judge who considered the matter enjoin[ing] EO-1, finding that it 
likely violated the Constitution.”309  In their estimation, the 
“[p]laintiffs here do not just plausibly allege with particularity 
that the Proclamation’s purpose is driven by anti-Muslim bias, 
they offer undisputed evidence of such bias: the words of the 
President.”310   
The Supreme Court felt otherwise, stating that “the issue 
before us is not whether to denounce [Candidate Trump’s] 
statements.  It is instead the significance of those statements in 
reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face, addressing 
a matter within the core of executive responsibility.”311  What 
then could the proverbial “reasonable observer” reasonably 
conclude about Proclamation 9645 if, as Justice Sotomayor 
argued, “the dispositive and narrow question” is what such a 
person, “presented with all ‘openly available data,’ the text and 
‘historical context’ . . . and the ‘specific sequence of events’” 
would conclude about its purpose.312  
Two of the criteria weigh in favor of the Proclamation, 
especially if the standard of review is traditional rational basis, 
which asks only “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of 
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validity of the orders, with Judge Niemeyer writing the unanimous panel opinion reversing 
and instructing that the complaint be dismissed.  See International Refugee Assistance 
Project v. Trump, 961 F.3d at 636, 654, rev’g International Refugee Assistance Project v. 
Trump, 373 F. Supp. 3d 650 (D. Md. 2019). 
310. International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F. 3d 233, 264 (4th Cir. 
2018).  
311. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018).  
312. Id. at 2438 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing McCreary Cnty. v. American Civ. 
Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 862-63 (2005)). 
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facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”313  
That is, is it reasonable as that term is understood in the operative 
constitutional tests, as opposed to “reasonable” as a normative 
value or matter of common sense. 
The text is neutral.  The Muslim faith is never mentioned.  
As such, the Proclamation falls within the admonition recently 
voiced by Justice Gorsuch, who emphasized that “only the words 
on the page constitute the law . . . approved by the President” and 
that “[i]f judges could add to, remodel, update, or detract from 
[its] . . . terms inspired only by extratextual sources and our own 
imaginations, we would risk amending” texts “outside the . . . 
process reserved for the people’s representatives.”314  The sole 
determinates for admission or exclusion are “the performance of 
all foreign governments” assessed in the light of three “baseline 
. . . criteria,”315 with the “detailed public comments of its 
sponsor,” in the words of the Court, “readily discoverable 
fact[s.]”316   
The “‘specific sequence of events,’” in turn, reveals a 
progression from purely political statements expressing a desire 
to discriminate against and exclude Muslims to a formal policy 
that focuses on security and “‘extreme vetting [of immigrants] 
from certain areas of the world.’”317  The work product?  Three 
presidential orders, each of which was neutral on its face, with 
each successor making an effort to cure perceived problems.  This 
sequence arguably makes for an easy case, allowing the Court to 
“infer[] [a neutral] purpose from a change in wording from an 
earlier [statement] to a later one.”318 
What about the “historical context”?  Did Candidate Trump, 
a veritable Pepe Le Pew who tries hard to be appealing in spite of 
his stench, shed his stripes and scent?  I have my doubts, freely 
admitting that I find it difficult if not impossible to believe that 
Donald Trump has ever embraced anything most of us would 
 
313. Federal Commc’ns Comm’n v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). 
314. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020). 
315. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,163 (Sept. 24, 2017).  
316. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 862. 
317. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2436, 2438 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(citing McCreary Cnty. v. American Civ. Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 862-63 (2005)) 
(quoting candidate Trump). 
318. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 862. 
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recognize as true convictions, other, that is, than his own self-
interest. 
His statements on the campaign trail may well have been 
cynically calculated red meat for a rabid and prejudiced base, 
conjured up simply to improve his electoral prospects.  His pre-
candidacy record, however, provides ample support for the 
conclusion that the “true Trump” – who infamously condemned 
“‘shithole countries’”319–harbors what can only be characterized 
as invidious biases against all of the usual suspects, including 
immigrants in general and Muslims in particular.   
As one early account notes, while “[s]ome Americans are 
just getting to know Donald Trump[,] [r]eaders of The Times 
have known him for 42 years.”320  That process began on October 
16, 1973–in a front-page article noting that the Department of 
Justice had “charg[ed] discrimination against blacks in apartment 
rentals.”321  The case was settled in June 1975, with “Trump 
Management not[ing] that the agreement did not constitute an 
admission of guilt.”322  Three years later, the Justice Department 
filed a supplemental brief stating that the Trumps had not 
complied with the consent decree.323  A recent report, in turn, 
claimed that at that time “[t]he Trumps were drowning in 
evidence of systemic racial discrimination. . . . On at least seven 
occasions, prospective tenants had filed complaints against the 
Trumps with the human rights commission, alleging racially 
discriminatory patterns and practices.”324 
Numerous additional indications of pronounced bias on 
Donald Trump’s part have been documented over the years.  
There are the full-page newspaper advertisements he purchased 
 
319. Julie Hirschfeld Davis et al., Trump Alarms Lawmakers With Disparaging Words 
for Haiti and Africa, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/TE2N-YRG6].  
320. David W. Dunlap, 1973: Meet Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2015) 
[https://perma.cc/7U3L-7EC3]. 
321. Morris Kaplan, Major Landlord Accused of Antiblack Bias in City, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 16, 1973) [https://perma.cc/CQ6J-3X23].  Trump denied the charges, claiming “‘[t]hey 
[were] “absolutely ridiculous.’”  Id.  
322. Dunlap, supra note 320.  
323. Plaintiff’s Motion for Supplemental Relief, United States v. Trump Mgmt., Inc., 
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (No. 73 Civ. 1529) [https://perma.cc/YLF6-L7EU]. 
324. Colin Kalmbacher, Nixon’s DOJ Had Proof the Trumps Were ‘Drowning in 
Evidence’ of Racial Discrimination, New Book Says, LAW & CRIME (Sept. 24, 2019), 
(quoting James D. Zirin in PLAINTIFF IN CHIEF: A PORTRAIT OF DONALD TRUMP IN 3,500 
LAWSUITS (2019)) [https://perma.cc/BCM9-8QCU].  
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promoting one of his supposed values, law and order, and urging 
a return of the death penalty, albeit focusing on the Central Park 
Five:  teenagers–four African Americans and one Hispanic–
falsely accused, arrested, and charged with the brutal rape of a 
white woman jogging.325  There is the $200,000 fine levied by the 
New Jersey Casino Control Commission after the Trump Plaza 
Hotel and Casino was accused of moving black employees off the 
floor at the request of a racist customer with ties to the mob.326  
And his slurs and attacks on Native Americans and the fines 
levied against him, even as he tried to fashion partnerships with 
them.327 
National origin?  Religion?  He has castigated “Japs,”328 has 
used a South Korean church as “a racial and religious cudgel 
against officials in [a] Florida town,”329 and, beginning in 2010, 
made it quite clear that he believes that we, as a nation, face a 
 
325. See Benjamin Mueller et al., City Releases Trove of Documents in Central Park 
Jogger Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2018), (wrongful convictions vacated after DNA testing 
and $41 million dollar settlement approved in federal civil rights lawsuit) 
[https://perma.cc/7JUG-QGRQ].  On Trump and the case, see, e.g., Sarah Burns, Why Trump 
Doubled Down on the Central Park Five, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2016), (quoting Trump, 
“‘Muggers and murderers should be forced to suffer and, when they kill, they should be 
executed for their crimes.’”) [https://perma.cc/36NU-B3KA]; Charles M. Blow, ‘I Want to 
Hate . . . ‘, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2018), (noting Trump’s statement “that the settlement was 
‘a disgrace’” and his “refus[al] to apologize or show any contrition whatsoever.”) 
[https://perma.cc/2AUS-KMBT]. 
326. See Appellate Court Upholds Trump Plaza Fine For Discrimination, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 19, 1992) (quoting court, “‘[i]n our view, the transcript fairly reeks 
of Trump Plaza’s guilt’” in “engag[ing] in racial and sexual discrimination to accommodate 
what they believed to be the preferences of Robert LiButti, a thoroughbred horse consultant 
from Secaucus”) [https://perma.cc/U78K-3AJW].  See Michael Isikoff, Video Shows Trump 
with Mob Figure He Denied Knowing, YAHOO! NEWS (Nov. 2, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/F6A7-T4QY].  
327. See, e.g., Alan Rappeport, Donald Trump’s Use of ‘Pochahontas’ Has Native 
Americans Worried, N.Y. TIMES  (June 17, 2016) (noting treatment of Elizabeth Warren and 
prior slurs) [https://perma.cc/UCC7-Z8PF]; Matt Flegenheimer & Steve Eder, Donald 
Trump’s Trips to Capitol Hill Years Ago Foretold Themes of Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (May 
11, 2016) (recounting attacks on individuals as not “‘look[ing] like Indians to me’” and 
accusations of organized crime in tribal gambling) [https://perma.cc/VW8Z-7XLX]. 
328. See, e.g., Julia Zorthian, Here’s Roughly Every Controversial Thing Donald 
Trump Has Ever Said Out Loud, TIME (Aug. 7, 2015) (quoting Trump, “‘Who the f– knows?  
I mean, really, who knows how much the Japs will pay for Manhattan property these days?’”) 
[https://perma.cc/UHC8-EPWZ]. 
329. See Alexander Burns, Donald Trump’s Instinct for Racially Charged Rhetoric, 
Before His Presidential Bid, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2015) [https://perma.cc/4XEA-QZLC]. 
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“‘Muslim Problem.’”330  One biographer argues that “[t]hose who 
know Mr. Trump say that his attitude toward immigrants long 
predates his entry into politics.”331  A second observer notes that 
“Trump launched his political career in 2011 by falsely accusing 
President Barack Obama of being a secret Muslim.”332  And there 
are at least four documented occasions, starting in September 
2010, where non-candidate Trump claimed that there is indeed a 
“‘Muslim problem,’” individuals harboring an abundance of 
“hatred” and adhering to a sacred text, the Qur’an, that “‘teaches 
some very negative vibe.’”333   
Is this the real Donald Trump?  My opinion?  Damn straight, 
notwithstanding recent protestations that “I am the least racist 
person in this room,” and that “[i]f you look, with the exception 
of Abraham Lincoln, possible exception, nobody has done what 
I’ve done.”334   
More to the point, he and his political advisors are savvy 
enough to understand the importance of such sentiments for the 
individuals who support him.  One study of the 2016 election and 
electorate found that “Trump’s focus on terrorism and 
immigration is . . . in line with his base of primary supporters.  A 
full 81 percent of his supporters said terrorism was very important 
and 72 percent said immigration was very important.”335  These 
 
330. See Brent Baker, To Letterman’s Irritation, Trump Denounces Ground Zero 
Mosque as ‘Insensitive,’ ‘Somebody Knocked Down the World Trade Center’, MEDIA RSCH. 
CTR. (Sept. 2, 2010) [https://perma.cc/H9QX-YC3J]; 86 Times Donald Trump Displayed or 
Promoted Islamophobia, MEDIUM (Apr. 19, 2018) [https://perma.cc/2SGD-BH2G].  
331. Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Stoking Fears, Trump Defied 
Bureaucracy to Advance Immigration Agenda, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2017) (reporting 
observation by Michael D’Antonio, author of “The Truth About Trump.”) 
[https://perma.cc/66VF-8AR3]. 
332. C.J. Werleman, It’s Not Just a Political Ploy, Trump’s Hatred of Muslims Must 
be Taken Seriously, INSIDE ARABIA (June 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/S42T-K6DY].   
333. MEDIUM, supra note 330.  
334. Adam Nagourney, 4 Key Trump Moments at the Final Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/2R9Z-G42V].  He’s right.  No president has come close to doing 
what he has done in so many areas, to the detriment of the nation. 
335. John Sides, Race, Religion, and Immigration in 2016: How the Debate Over 
American Identity Shaped the Election and What it Means for a Trump Presidency, 
DEMOCRACY FUND VOTER STUDY GRP. (June 2017) [https://perma.cc/3XWY-2KFL]; see 
also Emily Ekins, The Five Types of Trump Voters: Who They Are and What They Believe, 
DEMOCRACY FUND VOTER STUDY GRP. (June 2017) (“[S]upport for the temporary ban on 
Muslim immigration among Trump voters far exceeds support among non-Trump voters.”) 
[https://perma.cc/6RQA-LPQH]; Robert Griffin & Ruy Teixeira, The Story of Trump’s 
Appeal: A Portrait of Trump Voters, DEMOCRACY FUND VOTER STUDY GRP. (June 2017) 
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data both help explain the unexpected Trump victory in 2016 and 
the policies he has embraced as President.  The issue, one 
observer notes, is not simply what Trump promised.  It is also the 
“perception [of his supporters] of how well he fulfills it.”336 
This suggests that the appearance of the first Executive 
Order a mere seven days after taking office was inevitable and not 
simply prompt fulfillment of a campaign promise.  Rather, it 
reflected long-standing core sentiments and was an initial marker 
in deliberate strategy to both be true to himself and maintain his 
hold on a group that was then and continues to be critical to his 
political viability.  Immigration policy was not, admittedly, a 
central factor in the 2020 campaign,337 likely, like millions of 
Americans, a victim of COVID-19 and Trump’s non-policy 
policies responding to that health crisis.  But those concerns 
remained central for a President and administration that 
recognized the need to remind the base of his focus on 
immigration and his beloved wall in the campaign’s waning 
days.338 
Does the undeniable fact that the three orders were silent on 
religion matter?  At the risk of oversimplifying–a necessary evil 
in what is admittedly a truncated discussion–the answer likely lies 
in how we view two things.  The first is what Rudy Giuliani has 
described as the administration’s attempt to find “‘the right way 
to do it legally.’”339  The second, post-Trump litigation depicting 
reliable indications of what the ban actually constituted and 
accomplished. 
The most commonly cited source discussing the drafting 
process is an article relating Giuliani’s version of events during 
an interview by Fox News commentator Jeanine Pirro.  
 
(“Muslims were at the center of many of Trump’s comments and policy proposals.”) 
[https://perma.cc/3K9B-W7G2]. 
336. Emma Green, It Was Cultural Anxiety That Drove White, Working-Class Voters 
to Trump, THE ATLANTIC (May 9, 2017) [https://perma.cc/99U7-QL8Q]. 
337. See, e.g., Sabrina Siddiqui et al., Trump Campaign Tones Down Immigration 
Messages That Dominated 2016 Election, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2020) (noting “immigration 
was the fourth most mentioned issue in” Trump campaign ads in 2016 “but has barely 
cracked the top 10 this cycle”) [https://perma.cc/L47S-XS8D]. 
338. See, e.g., Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Trump’s Hard-Line Immigration Policies Go 
Before Voters, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2020) [https://perma.cc/K3WC-LMDW]. 
339. Amy B. Wang, Trump Asked for a ‘Muslin Ban,’ Giuliani Says–and Ordered a 
Commission to Do It ‘Legally’, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc/AL6U-
7ELD]. 
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“How did the president decide the seven countries?” she 
asked.  “Okay, talk to me.” 
“I’ll tell you the whole history of it,” Giuliani responded 
eagerly.  “So when [Trump] first announced it, he said 
‘Muslim ban.’  He called me up.  He said, ‘Put a commission 
together,  Show me the right way to do it legally.’” 
Giuliani said he assembled a “whole group of other very 
expert lawyers on this,” including former U.S. attorney 
general Michael Mukasey, Rep. Mike McCaul (R-Tex.) and 
Rep. Peter T. King (R-N.Y.). 
And what we did was we focused on, instead of religion, 
danger–the areas of the world that create danger for us,” 
Giuliani told Pirro.  “Which is a factual basis, not a religious 
basis.  Perfectly legal, perfectly sensible.  And that’s what 
the ban is based on.  It’s not based on religion.  It’s based on 
places where there are substantial evidence that people are 
sending terrorists into our country.”340 
The article, and Giuliani’s version of what happened and 
why, are important elements in virtually every opinion in the 
litigation assessing the intent of the various orders.341  The key 
questions: what exactly happened and, critically, when?  The 
original story stated that “[i]t was unclear when the phone call [to] 
Giuliani took place and when the commission began working.”342  
Most of the decisions in the stream of cases that led to Trump do 
not discuss this.  They do note that Giuliani contended that he was 
contacted, and his commission created, “when the President ‘first 
announced it, [and] said, ‘Muslim ban.’”343   
At least two accounts place this in late spring and summer of 
2016.344  In one rendition, “[i]n early July 2016, Giuliani 
indicated that his commission caused President Trump’s proposal 
to shift from a ‘general ban’ to ‘very specific, targeted criteria’ 
 
340. Id.  
341. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018); Arab Am. Civ. Rts. 
League v. Trump, 399 F. Supp. 3d 717, 720 (E.D. Mich. 2019); International Refugee 
Assistance Project v. Trump, 373 F. Supp. 3d 650, 655 (D. Md. 2019). 
342. Wang, supra note 339. 
343. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2417. 
344. See, e.g., Arab Am. Civ. Rts. League, 399 F. Supp. 3d at 720 (placing the initiation 
of the process “[i]n the summer of 2016”); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 265 F. Supp. 3d 
at 585 (“In a May 11, 2016 appearance on On the Record, Trump stated that he would ask 
former New York City Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani to lead a group to ‘look at the Muslim 
ban or temporary ban,’ that there ‘has to be something.’”).  
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focusing on specific countries.”345  That version of the events 
arguably credits the Giuliani account, describing a relatively early 
transition from a “Muslim ban” to a policy that bars admission 
“‘legally’” via “‘extreme vetting from certain areas of the 
world.’”346  Viewed in that light, it distances neutral texts actually 
issued from comments expressing the views and possible intent 
of an unelected candidate. 
Unsurprisingly, the manner in which advocates, judges, and 
the press portray these matters varies.  Chief Justice Roberts, for 
example, recounted virtually all of the reported details, creating 
the strong impression that the rationale for the three orders was 
indeed to deal with “‘danger’” and respond to “‘substantial 
evidence’” that certain nations “‘are sending terrorists into our 
country.’”347  Justice Sotomayor, on the other hand, reduced the 
account to the bare contention that “one of President Trump’s key 
advisers candidly drew the connection between EO-1 and the 
‘Muslim ban’ that the President had pledged to implement if 
elected.”348  In a similar vein, a frequently-cited article leads with 
the claim that “[f]ormer New York mayor Rudy W. Giuliani said 
President Trump wanted a ‘Muslim ban’ and requested he 
assemble a commission to show him ‘the right way to do it 
legally.’”349  A subsequent account paints a starkly different 
picture, with Giuliani stating “that Trump had not asked him how 
to craft a legal Muslim ban.”350  Referring specifically to the Pirro 
interview,  
“Muslim ban” is “the incorrect interpretation,” Giuliani said.  
He said Trump more accurately asked, “what can he do to 
legally keep the country safe” or “how can I do whatever I’m 
going to do legally?” 
“For example, what we told him is he shouldn’t do a Muslim 
ban,” Giuliani said.  “The way I interpreted it, it was, ‘Tell 
me what I can do legally,’ not, ‘Tell me how I can get around 
 
345. Arab Am. Civ. Rts. League, 399 F. Supp. 3d at 720. 
346. Id. (quoting President Trump during Oct. 9, 2016 debate). 
347. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018) (quoting Giuliani account). 
348. Id. at 2436 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
349. Wang, supra note 339. 
350. Matt Zapotosky, Judge Orders Government to Turn Over Documents from Rudy 
Giuliani on Travel Ban, WASH. POST (May 13, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9PPZ-4RTZ].  
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and do a Muslim ban and find some kind of legal justification 
for it.’  ‘We did just the opposite.’”351 
There is nothing particularly unusual about this.  Those who 
are honest about such matters understand that judges and 
advocates routinely select and depict “evidence” and “facts” in 
ways that comport with the perspectives they embrace and the 
results they wish to fashion.  That said, there are problems with 
the Giuliani account.  This is more than simple reservations about 
the honesty and reliability of an individual whose record since 
signing on with Trump is less than exemplary, especially in the 
wake of his post-election hair dye issues and porn-shop fronted 
press conferences.352  As one critic has noted, “[c]ountless 
reputations have been sacrificed in the fires of Trump worship, 
but Giuliani’s decline is remarkable given his once-towering 
stature.”353   
Giuliani describes “‘do[ing] it,’” but does not explain 
exactly what the “it” is and is not pressed on the point, much as 
another president, William Jefferson Clinton, teased us with the 
supposed intricacies of “‘what the meaning of the word “is” 
is.’”354 
Is the “it” Donald Trump sought and Rudy Giuliani helped 
fashion an actual Muslim ban?  Or is “it,” as he subsequently 
claimed, simply a legally sound policy?  Did the “commission” in 
fact persuade an otherwise recalcitrant candidate and eventual 
president to see the wisdom in “vetting?”  Or did an intractable 
bigot simply don a policy sheep’s cloak to hide his wolfish true 
intentions?  Given the record, diametrically opposed conclusions 
 
351. Id. 
352. See, e.g., Jonah E. Bromwich, Whatever It Is, It’s Probably Not Hair Dye,  N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 19, 2020) (“Rudolph W. Giuliani gave a news conference on Thursday in 
which, as he continued to cast doubt on the results of the presidential election, it appeared he 
was starting to melt.”) [https://perma.cc/F3SE-NP9C]; Annie Karni & Nick Corasaniti, 
Which Four Seasons? Oh, Not That One.,  N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2020) (press conference held 
in front of a landscaping business and adjacent to a porn shop and crematorium) 
[https://perma.cc/6WLC-SCLZ]. 
353. Seth Hettena, What Happened to America’s Mayor?, ROLLING STONE (May 17, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/VN5P-P9GM]. 
354. Wang, supra note 339.  Timothy Noah, Bill Clinton and the Meaning of “Is”, 
SLATE (Sept. 13, 1998) [https://perma.cc/J6H8-E6BB]; see also An Appraisal; Bill Clinton’s 
Mixed Legacy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2001) (noting Clinton’s “fateful decision to deceive 
Mrs. Clinton, a grand jury and all Americans about sexual adventurism in the Oval Office”) 
[https://perma.cc/4DKR-RRDC]. 
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are not unreasonable.  On the one hand, Trump asked how to do 
a Muslim ban.  On the other, his goal was a constitutionally sound 
policy, focusing on “‘danger.’”355  
How do we resolve this?  A second post-Trump 
consideration tracks what Justices Kennedy and Breyer stressed 
in their separate opinions.  The Giuliani account is one “instance[] 
in which . . . statements and actions . . . [have not been] subject to 
judicial scrutiny or intervention.”356  As such, most of this is the 
sort of “anecdotal evidence” that should be credited if and only if 
it is evaluated via the rigors of “judicial factfinding.”357  Indeed, 
one commentary has characterized the statements as hearsay, rife 
with “precisely the sorts of ambiguities that cross-examination is 
designed to resolve.”358  For example, in what precise ways, if 
any, has Proclamation 9645 actually been “‘watered down,’” such 
that it could, and per Presidential protest, should be “‘far larger, 
tougher, and more specific’”?359  Yes, it is now “politically 
correct,” in that it does not mention, much less target, Muslims.  
But what does that mean as a matter of purpose and, more 
tellingly, of actual effect, both as written and, to my way of 
thinking, more importantly, in the light of demonstrable 
outcomes? 
Careful examination has not occurred.  Crucial witnesses 
have not been deposed, much less testified in court subject to 
cross-examination under oath.  Key documents have, in turn, not 
been placed in the record.  I am confident everyone would agree 
that if the Giuliani Commission did indeed produce a written 
report it would be immeasurably helpful to know its precise 
terms, findings, recommendations, and rationales.  The plaintiffs 
asked for a copy in one post-Trump challenge to Proclamation 
9645.360  In an unfortunate and, to me, incomprehensible reprise 
of its refusal to disclose the infamous “worldwide review” that 
 
355. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018) (quoting Giuliani account). 
356. Id. 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
357. Id. at 2433 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
358. Maggie Wittlin, Meta-Evidence and Preliminary Injunctions, 10 UC IRVINE L. 
REV. 1331, 1333 (2020). 
359. Arab Am. Civ. Rts. League v. Trump, 399 F. Supp. 3d 717, 720 (E.D. Mich. 2019) 
(quoting Sept. 15, 2017 tweets by President Trump). 
360. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Production of 
Documents at 10-12, Arab Am. Civ. Rts. League v. Trump, 399 F. Supp. 3d 717 (E.D. Mich. 
2019) (No. 2:17-cv-10310-VAR-SDD). 
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informed the drafting of the Proclamation, the Trump 
Administration was unwilling to provide it.361   
This is not a matter where executive privilege could possibly 
apply if, as Giuliani claims, the decision to shift from a religion-
based ban to an attempt to protect the nation was made in mid-
2016.  It does have bearing on the ability of a court “to determine 
and evaluate the President’s own policy determination” by 
revealing “the policy rationale[s] of . . . unelected subordinates 
and attorneys, with which the President has repeatedly expressed 
disagreement.”362  Each side pretends to know the answers.  To 
date, neither has presented a complete and credible account.  It is 
accordingly impossible to determine the baseline facts, much less 
reach reliable conclusions about just what was done, when, and 
why. 
B. An Illegitimate Effect? 
If, as most critics have alleged, the heart of the matter is 
whether the Proclamation violates the Establishment Clause, any 
discussion of intent must inevitably account for the reality that the 
best path for reaching “an understanding of [the] official 
objective” most likely will “emerge[] from readily discoverable 
fact, without any judicial psychoanalysis of [the] drafter’s heart 
of hearts.”363  Did the Trump Administration “hide[]” its 
“religious motive so well that the ‘objective observer, acquainted 
with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the 
[Proclamation] . . . cannot see it”?364  What, then, does the 
“openly available data” reveal?  This is, for me, a crucial 
 
361. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017); 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Production of Documents 
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362. International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F. 3d 233, 346-47 (4th 
Cir. 2018) (Wynn, J., concurring). 
363. McCreary Cnty. v. American Civ. Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) 
(citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
364. Id. at 863 (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)). 
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consideration–especially when comparing the actions taken by 
Donald Trump with those of F.D.R.  
One of the very real difficulties is that Trump was litigated 
in the light of examples provided by a very small sample of 
individuals affected by them.365  The potential impact of the 
orders on the named plaintiffs was sufficiently real to confer 
standing, albeit, at least as matters have developed to date, not to 
provide relief on the basis of their constitutional claims.366  But, 
as matters stood when the Court ruled the sample of parties was 
small.  More to the point, given that the real issues were the 
validity of the policy and its implications for the future of both 
presidency and nation, we cannot and should not ignore the fact 
that there was–for obvious reasons–no developed record 
documenting the actual, systematic impact of Proclamation No. 
9645 on groups and entities alleging invidious discrimination 
against them on the basis of their religion.  
This is not simply an academic quibble.  In the underlying 
case before the Court, virtually all harms posited were couched in 
terms of future collective injuries to “educational institutions, 
[the] tourism industry, and . . . sovereign rights.”367  As framed in 
the original complaint, the “grievous harm[s]” that formed the 
basis for the case were couched in terms of future federal 
immigration policy that would have a pernicious, continuous 
impact on how the State of Hawaii, its institutions, and its citizens 
lived their lives.368  Key elements of that included immediate, 
personal harms to individual named plaintiffs.  But they also 
spoke in more general terms:  
[Proclamation 9645] will prevent the University of Hawaii 
from recruiting and retaining qualified individuals, impair 
the State’s tourism industry, undermine its refugee 
resettlement program, thwart its nondiscrimination laws, and 
effect an unconstitutional establishment of religion.  It will 
 
365. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2406 (2018) (noting the individual and 
associational plaintiffs). 
366. To date, the virtually unanimous view in the waiver litigation has been that the 
marriage and family separation claims do not implicate cognizable due process or equal 
protection harms. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1151 (D. Haw. 2017). 
367. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 
at 6, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 1:17-cv-00050). 
368. Proposed Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, 
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 1:17-cv-00050).  
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also bar Dr. Elshikh, John Doe 1, and John Doe 2–as well as 
thousands of similarly situated individuals–from seeing 
close family members, impair their livelihoods, and 
denigrate them as Muslims and as equal citizens. And [it] 
will inhibit the Muslim Association of Hawaii from 
welcoming new members and visitors, and subject it to 
discrimination at the hands of its own government.369 
The majority of these harms were prospective, even as their 
immediate and short-term impacts were sufficient to make the 
case ripe and confer standing.370  This strongly suggests that, if 
our goal is to understand whether a ban of any sort is 
constitutional and in the national interest, we need to know a great 
deal more. 
Do we?  Numerous reports verify that the Trump 
administration’s immigration policies in the aggregate 
substantially reduced the number of individuals who gained 
entry.371  The Trump administration clearly succeeded in its quest 
to drastically reduce the number of foreign nationals admitted, 
either as visitors, as permanent residents, or illegally.  
Unfortunately, most reports simply sketch the overall picture.  
There is no information about the extent to which the litigated ban 
has actually identified and excluded two key groups.  Given the 
avowed purpose, the most important is individuals who actually 
pose the risk of “terrorist attacks and other public-safety 
threats.”372 The second is Muslims, who are in the majority in 
eight of the thirteen nations now subject to the ban.373 
 
369. Id. 
370. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2416. 
371. Steven A. Camarota, There Really Has Been a ‘Trump Effect’ on Immigration, 
NAT’L REV. (Oct. 28, 2020) (noting low immigration levels under Trump, albeit stressing 
that “the really big change seems to have been out-migration–the number of immigrants 
leaving”) [https://perma.cc/3L8Q-MQFX]; Zolan Kanno-Youngs, As Trump Barricades the 
Border, Legal Immigration Is Starting to Plunge, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/U4YZ-XWAP].   
372. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,162 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
373. Two orders have changed the composition of the ban.  See Proclamation 9723, 83 
Fed. Reg. 15937 (April 10, 2018) (removing Chad); Proclamation, 85 Fed. Reg. 6699 (Jan. 
31, 2020) (adding Burma (Myanmar), Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tanzania).  
Chad is majority-Muslim (55.1%) and two of original eight (North Korea and Venezuela) 
have Muslim totals of less than 1%.  There are eight Muslim-majority nations on the current 
list.  Five from the original Proclamation (Iran (99.5%); Libya (96.6%); Somalia (99.8%), 
Syria (92.8%), and Yemen (99.1%)), and three added in January, 2020 (Kyrgzystan (89.4%), 
Nigeria (51.1%), and Sudan (90.7%)).  The remaining five have minority Muslim 
populations (Burma, 4.0%; Eritrea, 36.6%; North Korea, <1%), Tanzania, 34.1%), and 
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One private report that did focus on the travel ban 
documented two-year declines in admission for the Muslim-
majority countries on the original list, ranging from 87.1% for 
Yemen to 16.4% for Libya.374  But neither the data nor the 
attendant analysis identified the actual grounds for exclusion.   
A second, private account–focusing on the waiver program–
claimed that as of April 2020, 74% of the waiver applications had 
been declined.375  If true, that is troubling and consistent with 
what one court found, albeit at an early point in the process, 
concluding that approval rates were so low that it was appropriate 
to accept the contention that the program was “merely ‘window 
dressing.’”376  The State Department, however, paints a starkly 
different picture in a series of reports on “Implementation of 
President Proclamations (P.P.) 9645 and 9983.”377  They contain 
aggregate data for both the core visa process and the waiver 
program, including:  individuals admitted as “exception[s]” to the 
proclamations; individuals ineligible for admission on 
unspecified non-proclamation grounds; individuals ineligible for 
admission on proclamation grounds; and waivers granted.378  The 
most recent report indicates that 90,362 applicants were covered 
by the proclamations.379  When we subtract the individuals 
admitted as “exception[s]” (7,355) and those found “ineligible on 
non-[proclamation]” grounds (16,381), that leaves a total of 
41,838 found “ineligible” for admission on proclamation 
 
Venezuela (<1%)).  For the data, see the Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures website 
[https://perma.cc/8E6N-ZRGE] 
374. NAT’L FOUND. FOR AM. POL’Y, NEW DHS DATA SHOW LEGAL IMMIGRATION 
DECLINED MORE THAN 7% BETWEEN 2016 AND 2018 (2020) [https://perma.cc/3ZAY-
45ES].  The three not discussed, in turn, had Muslim populations ranging from less than 1% 
(North Korea and Venezuela) to 55.1% (Chad).  
375. BRIDGE: A GEO. UNIV. INITIATIVE, THE MUSLIM AND AFRICAN BANS 
[https://perma.cc/9MN2-8CMK]. 
376. Emami v. Nielsen, 365 F. Supp. 3d 1009, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (calculating 
approval rates of 1.75% and 2.3% for two months in 2018 and citing and quoting statements 
by Christopher Richardson, former consular officer).  Justice Breyer also noted the 
Richardson claims.  See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2432-33 (2018) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
377. At the time I am writing this, the most recent report is the report for December 8, 
2017 to January 20, 2021.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 2020 REPORT, Supra note 15. The first 
report was for December 8, 2017 to September 14, 2019.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 2019 
REPORT, Supra note 15.  
378. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 2020 REPORT, Supra note 15; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 2019 
REPORT, Supra note 15. 
379. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 2020 REPORT, Supra note 15. 
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grounds, and 24,750 granted waivers, a “success” rate if you will 
of 59.2%.380  
Time, and careful litigation, will tell us which account is 
true.  In the interim, the most troubling reality is that we are 
arguing about a ban that does not actually seem to focus on the 
real sources of any actual terrorists or terrorist activities.  
Consider, for example, the December 6, 2019, shooting at the 
Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Florida, the only deadly terrorist 
attack inside the United States since September 11, 2001.381  It 
was clearly not prevented.  Nor was it perpetrated by an individual 
from one of the nations targeted by any iteration of the Trump 
ban.  Rather, it was the work of a Saudi Arabian Air Force cadet, 
an individual from a nation conspicuously absent from the Trump 
radar.382 
The administration touted unraveling “significant ties to Al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.”383  What it did not acknowledge 
was that this “success story” actually highlighted the 
shortcomings of a travel ban that could not and did not prevent 
this attack.  Saudi Arabia is not one of the nations included in the 
ban, an omission whose justifications are subject to dispute.384  
More tellingly, “‘extreme vetting’” protocols similar to those that 
are part of the ban simply failed to work.385 
So where are we?  It may be that the proclamations 
constituted an unconstitutional “Muslim Ban” of the sort 
 
380. Id.   
381. PETER BERGEN ET AL., NEW AM., TERRORISM IN AMERICA AFTER 9/11: PART 
IV. WHAT IS THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES TODAY? [https://perma.cc/LKQ8-Q2SL].  
382. Nate Chute & Annie Blanks, Pensacola NAS Shooter: What We Know About 
Mohammed Saeed Alshamrani, PENSACOLA NEWS J. (Dec. 6, 2019) [https://perma.cc/V6E2-
SDY6].  
383. Press Release, Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Attorney General 
William P. Barr and FBI Director Christopher Wray Announce Significant Developments in 
the Investigation of the Naval Air Station Pensacola Shooting, (May 18, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/8GX8-RM75].  
384. Compare Timothy L. O’Brien, Look Who’s Not in Trump’s Travel Ban, 
BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2018) (speculating that “the fact that Trump is doing business in 
countries that didn’t make his roster” is a dispositive factor) [https://perma.cc/7UBC-84SW], 
with Ali Shihabi, Why Saudi Isn’t Part of Trump’s Travel Ban, AL ARABIYA NEWS (Feb. 11, 
2017) (“the most compelling reason why Saudi Arabia is not on the list is clear: Saudi Arabia 
is not, and has never been, considered by the State Department to be a state sponsor of 
terrorism”) [https://perma.cc/6Y9B-73H8]. 
385. See, e.g., Michael LaForgia & Eric Schmitt, The Lapses That Let a Saudi 
Extremist Shoot Up a U.S. Navy Base, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2020) [https://perma.cc/XKR5-
MFH8].  
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envisioned and championed by Candidate Trump.  Then again, it 
may be that, as formulated and implemented, the ban actually 
screened out and excluded only individuals who posed credible 
threats to national security.  We simply do not know.  And the 
silence in that respect seems telling, given Trump’s inherent 
braggadocio and habit of loudly touting accomplishments, real 
and imagined. 
This stands in stark contrast to the situation in Korematsu, 
where the record before the Court made it abundantly and 
undeniably clear that the government actions at issue targeted, 
and affected, only persons of Japanese ancestry.  More tellingly, 
there are critical differences between how these matters were 
approached in the lead-up to the Court’s holding in each case.   
At the risk of repetition, as Chief Justice Roberts noted, 
Candidate Trump did indeed “publish[] a ‘Statement on 
Preventing Muslim Immigration’ that called for a ‘total and 
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until 
our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.’”386  
But when the first iteration of the immigration ban was issued, it 
made no overt mention of “Muslims.”387  It did list and ban entry 
of individuals from a number of Muslim-majority nations.  But, 
in a clever and politically savvy bit of drafting, these were nations 
previously identified by the Obama administration and Congress 
as “detrimental to the interests of the United States.”388   
That is the reverse of what happened in the Japanese 
Exclusion Cases.  The original order was totally silent as to the 
race, ethnicity, or national origin of the individuals targeted.  It 
was only after responsibility for its implementation on the West 
Coast was vested in General DeWitt that the transition was made 
from a race-neutral policy to one that targeted the Japanese with 
laser-like focus.389  Indeed, the policies pursued on the West 
Coast stood in stark contrast to those formulated and implemented 
 
386. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018) (quoting Donald J. Trump’s 
“‘Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration’”).  Justice Sotomayor provides a more 
extensive catalogue of such promises in her dissent.  Id. at. 2435-37 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
387. See Exec. Order No. 13769, Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry 
Into the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
388. The list may be found at id. § 3(c).  The Obama-era roots of it are in turn discussed 
supra notes 293-302 and  accompanying text. 
389. See supra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.  
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when an individual who did not harbor racist sentiments was in 
charge of the drafting and implementation of the pertinent orders. 
Does that matter?  In Korematsu an initially neutral 
presidential order was transformed by both written policy and 
details of implementation into one targeting a specific group on 
the basis of their ethnicity and national origin.390  In Trump pre-
proclamation statements that were permeated with express bias 
eventually became a policy that was neutral on its face, even as it 
arguably could be anticipated to have a disproportionate impact 
on certain groups.391  In this respect, reactions may well track 
Justice Potter Stewart’s infamous take on obscenity.392  The actual 
orders may not actually be race-or religion-based.  But by damn, 
Donald Trump issued them, and for his critics that suffices: 
“[they] know it when [they] see it.”393 
We cannot escape or ignore the fact that there are distinct 
and troubling parallels between the statements of Candidate 
Trump and General DeWitt.  Both said things that cannot be 
characterized as anything other than racist.  The proclamations 
and orders General DeWitt issued gave explicit voice to these 
sentiments by specifically targeting the Japanese.  On their face, 
the measures were clearly discriminatory and as such fulfilled a 
core requirement for a constitutional equal protection claim, the 
presence of discriminatory intent.  The same cannot be said of the 
three Trump orders.  It is enough to note for current purposes that 
the parallels between Korematsu and Trump are not exact.  The 
case for raw invidious discrimination in Korematsu is 
overwhelming.  The same cannot be said for Trump, given 
important material distinctions between the DeWitt orders and 
proclamations and those actually issued by President, not 
Candidate Trump. 
Be all of this as it may, the question remains, and my goal 
has been to both pose it and make the case for what I believe to 
be the proper answer.  Did Chief Justice Roberts consign to the 
 
390. See supra notes 108-121 and accompanying text.  
391. See supra notes 307-11 and accompanying text.  Albeit, as noted, not an impact 
of the sort that had actually been documented at the time the case was litigated.  See supra 
notes 365-70 and accompanying text. 
392. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
393. Id. (“I shall not today attempt further to define [obscenity] . . . and perhaps I could 
never succeed in intelligibly doing so.  But I know it when I see it . . . .”). 
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judicial trash can all of Korematsu?  Or did he condemn and 
discard only the result and those portions of that opinion that 
ignored or explained away the reality that the West Coast 
measures did in fact discriminate on the basis of race, both as 
written and as applied?  I assume he did only the latter.  Indeed, I 
hope that even those who applaud his sentiments will nevertheless 
condemn the result.   
V.  THE CANON AND ANTICANON: A THOUGHT 
EXPERIMENT 
I would like to take it as a given that if the Court had known 
the full extent of the government’s suppression of highly 
probative evidence it would have reached a different set of 
conclusions in both Hirabayashi and Korematsu.  Not everyone 
agrees.  Professor Kang, for example, makes a persuasive case 
that the Court “was not actually ignorant of what was going on; it 
was willfully so.”394  He argues accordingly that “there is 
compelling circumstantial evidence that the Supreme Court 
would have applied the same techniques of segmentation and 
selective interpretation in order to affirm the convictions and not 
interfere with the internment machine.”395  Indeed, subsequent 
statements by Justices Black and Douglas are consistent with this 
account.396 
I also take it as a given that a large measure of the outrage 
lodged against both decisions is predicated on their invocation of 
racial profiling and not necessarily on many of the intrinsic details 
of the opinions themselves.  Indeed, most critics make the 
obligatory nod toward the fact that Hirabayashi and Korematsu 
laid the foundations for strict scrutiny, even as they ultimately 
condemn both as cases that “legalized racism.”397 
 
394. Kang, supra note 152, at 994 (emphasis in the original). 
395. Id. 
396. See, e.g., GERALD T. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 213 
(1977). 
397. Compare Greg Robinson & Toni Robinson, Korematsu and Beyond: Japanese 
Americans and the Origins of Strict Scrutiny, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 30, 39 (2005) 
(“the most decisive contribution of the Japanese Americans to the legal struggle for civil 
rights was in laying the foundation for the doctrine of strict scrutiny”), with id. at 31 (quoting 
with approval Justice Murphy’s characterization of Korematsu as “‘a legalization of 
racism’”) (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting)). 
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I want to suggest, accordingly, that it would be helpful to 
examine how we might react to a different series of cases if–and 
I cannot emphasize too much the crucial fact that this is a thought 
experiment, not a statement of reality–if material suppression of 
pertinent facts infect the decisions when they are viewed in 
hindsight.   
A.  Hindsight? 
It is important to understand that much of what people 
condemn about Hirabayashi and Korematsu is deeply informed 
by the blessings of hindsight.398  It is certainly possible to argue 
that the exclusion order was consistent with a considered 
application of the strict scrutiny standard, if and only if the 
national security justifications were true.399  There were 
individuals who criticized the decisions at the time, assessing the 
publicly available evidence and concluding that “[o]n the basis of 
the known facts [it] cannot [be] conclude[d] that the military 
situation or conditions on the west coast in early 1942 could 
honestly be deemed to require evacuation of 79,000 American 
citizens of Japanese ancestry, as a matter of ‘military necessity’ 
or otherwise.”400  But consistent with the prevailing ethos of 
World War II as a Great Crusade against the Forces of Darkness 
the general reaction to the decisions was muted.  The initial report 
in the New York Times, for example, discussed Korematsu but 
arguably treated both Endo and the administrative decision to end 
 
398. As Larry Tribe notes, “[i]n retrospect, the Supreme Court’s tolerance of the war-
time excesses . . . seems wrong, but in retrospect it is also clear that the Court saw no 
reasonable alternative to deference.”  LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 355 (2d ed. 1988). 
399. See supra text accompanying notes 125-85. 
400. Freeman, supra note 52, at 449-50.  The issue is designated as June 1943, but I 
have not been able to determine whether it was in print prior to the decision date in 
Hirabayashi, June 21, 1943.  A second piece in the same issue concluded otherwise, arguing 
that a failure to sustain DeWitt’s measures “would involve an unwarranted, unnecessary and 
terribly dangerous gamble with our chances for victory.”  Alexandre, supra note 55, at 413.  
That conclusion was premised on the application of the applicable legal standard at the time, 
that the government action was “[]reasonable.”  See id. at 407 (arguing that a “reasonable” 
racial classification will be sustained where there is “‘a legitimate object of legislation’”) 
(quoting Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 396 (1927)).  See also Hirabayashi 
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943) (there was “a reasonable basis for the action taken 
in imposing the curfew”). 
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the exclusion program as much more significant.401  The tide 
turned only in later years as the national commitment to eliminate 
racism intensified and details about the misrepresentations and 
omissions in the record and decisions began to emerge. 
In particular, Korematsu and Hirabayashi outrage 
blossomed in the wake of three developments.  The first was the 
publication of the report of a national commission empaneled to 
investigate and evaluate the curfews and internments.402  The 
second was the success of the efforts of both Gordon Hirabayashi 
and Fred Korematsu to have their convictions set aside, which 
produced opinions in which many of the sordid details of what 
actually happened were finally made public.403  The third was the 
passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which condemned the 
war-time orders and actions and authorized the payment of 
reparations to their Japanese victims.404 
Justice Black insisted until his death that he would have done 
the same thing regardless.  He stressed that “[t]here’s a difference 
between war and peace.  You can’t fight a war with the courts in 
control.”405  He also revealed an uglier side of thinking that belied 
his vehement denial that racism was in play: 
They all look alike to a person not a Jap.  Had they [the 
Japanese] attacked our shores you’d have a large number 
fighting with the Japanese troops.  And a lot of innocent 
Japanese-Americans would have been shot in the panic.  
Under these circumstances I saw nothing wrong in moving 
them away from the danger area.406 
Justice William O. Douglas also issued a subsequent 
disavowal–if disavowal it indeed be–that conveyed the deep sense 
of conflict posed by litigating these cases in the midst of World 
War II: 
Our Navy was sunk at Pearl Harbor and no one knew where 
the Japanese fleet was.  We were advised on oral argument 
that if the Japanese landed troops on our west coast nothing 
 
401. See Lewis Wood, Supreme Court Upholds Return of Loyal Japanese to West 
Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1944, at 1, 14. [https://perma.cc/AUR2-AMAZ] 
402. See Personal Justice Denied, supra note 75, at 1-2. 
403. See supra note 112 and cases cited therein. 
404. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903. 
405. DUNNE, supra note 396, at 213 (quoting Justice Black). 
406. Id. 
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could stop them west of the Rockies.  The military judgment 
was that, to aid in the prospective defense of the west coast; 
the enclaves of Americans of Japanese ancestry should be 
moved inland, lest the invaders by donning civilian clothes 
would wreck even more serious havoc on our western ports.  
The decisions were extreme and went to the verge of wartime 
power; and they have been severely criticized.  It is, 
however, easy in retrospect to denounce what was done, as 
there actually was no attempted Japanese invasion of our 
country.  While our Joint Chiefs of Staff were worrying 
about Japanese soldiers landing on the west coast, they 
actually were landing in Burma and at Kota Bharu in 
Malaya.  But those making plans for defense of the Nation 
had no such knowledge and were planning for the worst.  
Moreover, the day we decided Korematsu we also decided 
[Endo], holding that while evacuation of the Americans of 
Japanese ancestry was allowable under extreme war 
conditions, their detention after evacuation was not.407 
There are any number of problems with these statements.  It 
is certainly true that when the initial orders were issued in early 
1942 neither the military, the Court, nor the nation knew where 
the Japanese fleet was and whether there would be an invasion on 
the West Coast.  But when Hirabayashi was decided, everyone 
knew that a substantial portion of the Japanese fleet was at the 
bottom of the Pacific Ocean.408  The Guadalcanal campaign had 
been successfully concluded and the operations to secure the one 
remote piece of American territory that the Japanese did invade, 
the Aleutian Islands, were about to begin.409  Most importantly, 
the island-hopping campaigns that would inexorably push the 
Japanese back toward their homeland had been planned and were 
about to be put in motion.   
That initially positive but somewhat tenuous situation was 
definitive when Korematsu came before the Court.  The prospect 
of final and total American victory in the Pacific was clear.  
General Douglas MacArthur had fulfilled his pledge to return to 
 
407. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 339 n.20 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
408. See, e.g., Rostow, supra note 53, at 502-03 (noting that the tide had turned and 
that American “forces were poised for the offensive”).  Those wishing to document the 
military details should consult Volumes IV through VII of Samuel Eliot Morison’s definitive 
History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (various titles and dates). 
409. Rostow, supra note 53, at 502. 
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the Philippines.410  The United States Army Air Corps was 
“blast[ing] Japan” and major progress was reported in Allied 
efforts to push the Japanese out of Burma.411  Indeed, and 
ironically, on the very day Korematsu was issued, a front-page 
article in the New York Times noted that “[m]ass exclusion of 
persons of Japanese ancestry from [the] West Coast States was 
ended today by Maj. Gen. H. Conger Pratt, Western commander, 
in a proclamation effective on Jan. 2.”412  
Given these facts, one wonders how the Korematsu majority 
could cite, but not give effect to Chastleton Corporation v. 
Sinclair, within which Justice Holmes observed that “a Court is 
not at liberty to shut its eyes to an obvious mistake, when the 
validity of the law depends on the truth of what is declared.”413  
In particular, in words with special force given the radically 
altered circumstances of the war in December 1944, Holmes 
declared that “[a] law depending upon the existence of an 
emergency or other certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to 
operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change even though 
valid when passed.”414 
Chastleton provides an appropriate point of departure for my 
thought exercise: considering how we might now view four cases 
that are revered parts of the canon if they had been presented to 
the Court in the same manner as Korematsu.  Let’s think about 
how we would react to these cases and their holdings if we were 
to discover, long after the fact, that liberties had been taken, in 
particular that material evidence had been withheld or falsified. 
B. Reimagining Canonical Cases  
 
410. See, e.g., Frank L. Kluckhohn, 2 M’Arthur Gains: Mindoro Forces on Key Peaks 
11 Miles from Southwest Coast, Big Leyte Advance Made, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1944, at 1 
(noting on the same day Korematsu was decided that significant progress had been made in 
the campaign to reclaim the Philippines from the Japanese).   
411. See United Press, B-29’s Blast Japan and Hankow, China, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 
1944, at 1; Tillman Durbin, U.S. Unit Spearheads Burma Push, Routing Japanese Above 
Mandalay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1944, at 1. 
412. Lawrence E. Davies, Ban on Japanese Lifted on Coast: Army Area Chief Permits 
All Proved Loyal to Return to Three States After Jan. 2, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1944, at 1. 
413. 264 U.S. 543, 547 (1924); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219(1944).   
414. Id. at 547-48. 
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The first is Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
Kansas.415  One of the most notable aspects of that decision was 
the Court’s reliance on experiments conducted by Dr. Kenneth B. 
Clark supporting its conclusion that “‘[s]egregation with the 
sanction of law . . . has a tendency to [retard] the educational and 
mental development of negro children and to deprive them of 
some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated 
school system.’”416  In a footnote that has been both praised and 
condemned,417 the Court used the studies as a basis for discarding 
one of its most abhorrent prior statements, the observation in 
Plessy v. Ferguson that separate but equal imposed a “badge of 
inferiority.  . . . solely because the colored race chooses to put that 
construction upon it.”418  The footnote and the social science 
evidence were arguably unnecessary.  But they did give the Court 
something more than a Lochner-like “we know best” justification 
for rejecting one of the more infamous elements of Plessy, 
allowing it to observe “[w]hatever may have been the extent of 
psychological knowledge at the time . . . th[e] finding [that 
segregation imposes psychological harm] is amply supported by 
modern authority.”419 
What if the Clark experiments actually found that Black 
children derive great benefits, and suffer only minimal impacts on 
their self-esteem, if any, if they are educated in schools where 
virtually all of the students look like them?  Or if the Court had 
actually embraced different studies with different results?  One 
interesting but little-known curiosity is that a federal district court 
in Georgia did just that in Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County 
Board of Education, relying on a different set of “[s]tudies made 
of actual intermixing of groups in classrooms [that] confirm the 
predicted result that an increase in cross-group contacts increases 
 
415. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
416. Id. at 494. 
417. Id. at 494 n.10.  On the pros and cons, compare Mark R. Killenbeck, Affirmative 
Action and the Courts: From Plessy to Brown to Grutter, and Back?, in SOCIAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS IN LEGAL DECISION MAKING: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 91, 103 
(Richard L. Wiener et al. eds., 2007) (describing with approval the use of social science in 
Brown), with CARL BRENT SWISHER, THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN ROLE 158 (1958) 
(lambasting Brown as “based neither on the history of the [Fourteenth A]mendment nor on 
precise textual analysis but on” the “highly evanescent grounds” of “‘psychological 
knowledge’”). 
418. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) 
419. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
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pre-existing racial hostility rather than ameliorates it.”420  What 
if, based on that evidence, the Brown Court did not reject separate 
but equal and ordered only that true equality in all pertinent 
respects should be achieved for all schools, both White and 
Black?  More to the point for my purposes, what would our 
reaction to the decision be if we subsequently learned that 
Thurgood Marshall and his colleagues had engaged in the same 
manipulation and same concealment of pertinent evidence that the 
government did in Hirabayashi and Korematsu? 
It is worth noting, for example, that at least one member of 
Marshall’s legal team, William T. Coleman, argued vigorously 
that the Clark material should not be used, exclaiming at one point 
“‘Jesus Christ, those damn dolls!  I thought it was a joke.’”421  
Critics at the time noted that the Clark tests did not actually 
“isolate the effects of segregation per se on children’s racial 
identity” and that “children in northern, integrated schools 
displayed slightly greater rates of white preference than children 
from the southern, segregated schools.”422  What if these views, 
bolstered by the studies embraced by the Stell litigants, prompted 
Marshall to suppress the Clark material once they arrived at the 
Court? 
What about Roe v. Wade?423  One of the most important 
realities about that case is that the majority opinion was assigned 
to Justice Harry Blackmun, who came to the Court with deep 
connections to the Mayo Hospitals and Clinics in Rochester, 
 
420. 220 F. Supp. 667, 674 (S.D. Ga. 1963).  This line of defense was summarily 
rejected on interlocutory appeal based on the holding in Brown.  See Stell v. Savannah-
Chatham Cty. Bd. of Educ., 318 F. 2d 425, 427 (5th Cir. 1963); see also Stell v. Savannah-
Chatham Cty. Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55, 65-66 (5th Cir. 1964) (subsequently reversing the 
lower court opinion), cert. denied sub nom. Roberts v. Stell, 379 U.S. 933 (1964).  Judge 
Wisdom subsequently characterized the notion “that Brown was decided for sociological 
reasons” as a “bewitch[ing] and bewilder[ing] . . . popular myth,” stressing that then court 
had decisively rejected the assertion that “innate differences in the races in their aptitude for 
educability are a reasonable basis for classifying children by race.”  Jackson Mun. Separate 
Sch. Dist. v. Evers, 357 F. 2d 653, 654 (5th Cir. 1966).  For a full treatment of the issues, 
studies, and cases, see I. A. NEWBY, CHALLENGE TO THE COURT: SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND 
THE DEFENSE OF SEGREGATION 1954-1966 (rev. ed. 1969). 
421. WILLIAM T. COLEMAN JR., COUNSEL FOR THE SITUATION: SHAPING THE LAW TO 
REALIZE AMERICA’S PROMISE 123 (2010).   
422. Gwen Bergner, Black Children, White Preference: Brown v. Board, the Doll 
Tests, and the Politics of Self-Esteem, 61 AM. Q. 299, 307 (2009) (emphasis in the original). 
423. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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Minnesota.424  Justice Blackmun conducted intensive research 
into the medical facts about abortion.  This provided the 
foundations for his trimester system, within which the 
permissibility of restrictions of what is after all a medical 
procedure changed as the medical benefits and risks altered as the 
pregnancy progressed.425 
The parties submitted evidence about these matters.  But 
what if the attorneys for Norma Jean McCorvey misrepresented 
the medical facts or hid key data?  They didn’t, but what if?  What 
if the “scientific” evidence before the Court was actually 
defective or misleading?426  Especially if someone less familiar 
with the medical world had been assigned the majority opinion 
and had not undertaken the same due diligence as Harry 
Blackmun?   
The stark divide between the oversimplified division of 
today’s Roe supporters and critics into pro-choice and pro-life 
factions means one side will always be unhappy, no matter what 
the Court does.  And, as the recent relitigation of state attempts to 
impose a hospital “admitting privileges” restriction on abortion 
providers shows, neither demonstrable facts nor prior binding 
precedent seem important to those seeking to restrict access to 
abortion and, in their fondest dreams, overturn Roe.427  That said, 
how would we react to the original Roe opinion if we now 
discover that its medical foundations were specious?  Indeed, we 
could ask the same of the decision that reaffirmed the core of Roe, 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
within which the joint opinion observed that “[w]e have seen how 
time has overtaken some of Roe’s factual assumptions.”428  The 
Casey Court discarded the trimester system and drew the line for 
 
424. Details about Justice Blackmun and his approach to Roe may be found in an 
excellent biography, LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY 
BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 18 (1st ed. 2005). 
425. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 148-51, 160-64. 
426. That is a problem that has plagued recent abortion-limitation litigation.  For a 
lengthy, detailed, and carefully reasoned example of a court looking with care at the 
precedents and the scientific evidence, see Little Rock Family Plan. Servs. v. Rutledge, 398 
F. Supp. 3d 330, 375-90 (E.D. Ark. 2019).   
427. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2112-13 (2020) 
(invalidating a Louisiana admitting privileges requirement deemed “almost word-for-word 
identical” to one previously struck in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 
(2016)). 
428. 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992). 
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differential regulation at the point of viability.429  Notably, in each 
instance, key aspects of the decisions rested on the reliability of 
medical facts and evidence and our willingness to accept it. 
A third exemplar is Grutter v. Bollinger, 430 within which the 
Court held that the quest for diversity in an entering college or 
university class was a compelling interest and that an applicant’s 
race, ethnicity, or national origin could be taken into account, 
provided the admissions process met the hallmarks of narrow 
tailoring.  One key element in Justice O’Connor’s majority 
opinion was trial testimony establishing that the Michigan Law 
School did not adjust its standards or procedures as the 
admissions process went forward.431  This was a concern given 
that the admissions office routinely prepared updates during the 
admissions cycle identifying the group composition of the 
projected entering class.432  Justice Kennedy made this reality a 
factor in his vigorous dissent.433  But Justice O’Connor accepted 
the testimony of Dennis Shields, the law school’s Director of 
Admissions, who stated that the daily reports were not used “to 
admit a particular percentage or number of [underrepresented] 
minority students.”434 
I know Dennis Shields.  He is an honorable man who 
certainly did not falsify his testimony.  But again, what if?  I also 
know any number of individuals with a role in admissions whose 
deep devotion to diversity has led them astray.  Indeed, that was 
one of the factors that doomed the University of Texas School of 
Law’s admissions process rejected in Hopwood v. State of 
Texas.435  The Court of Appeals panel noted two things about the 
Texas process.  The first was that the law school employed a dual 
track admissions system, within which white and minority 
 
429. Id. at 869-76. 
430. 539 U.S. 306, 328-30, 333-34 (2003). 
431. Id. at 318 (discussing testimony of Dennis Shields, Director of Admissions, 
regarding how the law school used “‘daily reports’ that kept track of the racial and ethnic 
composition of the [potential entering] class.”). 
432. Id. 
433. Id. at 391-92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he consultation of daily 
reports during the last stages in the admissions process suggests there was no further attempt 
at individual review save for race itself”). 
434. Id. at 318 (majority opinion). 
435. 78 F.3d 932, 932 (5th Cir. 1996), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 84 F.3d 720, 
721 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thurgood Marshall Legal Soc’y v. Hopwood, 518 
U.S. 1001, 1033 (1996). 
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candidates were assessed by different groups and under different 
admissions criteria.436  The second was that for the entering class 
for which Cheryl Hopwood applied, the admissions indices were 
adjusted during the admissions cycle, and lowered, for minority 
applicants “in order to admit more of this group.”437   
Both of those practices were forbidden by Bakke.438  
Michigan did not do these things.  Neither does Harvard College, 
or at least so the District Court found recently in an opinion 
affirmed on appeal that most observers believe will be taken up 
by the Supreme Court.439  But Texas did, even as it maintained 
with an apparent straight face that its system complied with the 
applicable legal standards.440  Once again, what if?  What if the 
conclusion that the Michigan system was narrowly tailored rested 
on falsified data? 
Finally, and most tellingly, there is Trump itself.  One key 
factor allowing the travel ban to survive was the premise that there 
had been a rigorous world-wide review of the policies and 
practices of all countries to determine if their screening 
procedures “confirm[ed] the identity of individuals seeking entry 
into the United States, and . . . determine[d] whether those 
individuals pose[d] a security threat.”441  It was only after the 
“completion of the worldwide review [that] President [Trump] 
issued the Proclamation before us.”442 
Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly cited and emphasized this 
in his opinion for the Court.443  But he did not provide any actual 
details about how the reviews were conducted and on what basis 
 
436. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936-38. 
437. Id. at 936 n.6. 
438. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (stating that 
“it is inconceivable that a university would thus pursue the logic of petitioner’s two-track 
program to the illogical end of insulating each category of applicants with certain desired 
qualifications from competition with all other applicants”); id. at 316 (stressing the need for 
a threshold determination that all “applicants who are ‘admissible’ and deemed capable of 
doing good work in their courses” (quoting the Harvard College policy)). 
439. See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard 
College, 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed (Feb. 25, 2021) (20-1199).  
440. For a discussion of the Texas system in the light of Bakke, see Mark R. 
Killenbeck, Pushing Things up to Their First Principles: Reflections on the Values of 
Affirmative Action, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1362-68 (1999). 
441. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 U.S. 2392, 2404 (2018). 
442. Id. 
443. See, e.g., id. at 2405 (“DHS collected and evaluated data regarding all foreign 
governments.”). 
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the government decided that a given country complied.  Rather, 
he simply listed the general criteria.444  Indeed, one thorny issue 
for the Court was the administration’s refusal to release the report 
or disclose any of the actual evidence on which it based its policy.  
As Justice Sotomayor stressed in her dissent, “the majority 
empowers the President to hide behind an administrative review 
process that the Government refuses to disclose to the public.”445  
That document has still not seen the light of day.  All we know is 
that it “was a mere 17 pages,” which the dissent argued “raises 
serious questions about the legitimacy of the President’s 
proclaimed national-security rationale.”446 
Once again, what if?  What if, for example, the reviews for 
England, France, and Germany–staunch allies, albeit nations with 
substantial Muslim populations–consisted of a low-level 
functionary in the Department of Homeland Security calling an 
equally low-level functionary in our embassies in those nations, 
simply asking, “are they doing a good job”?  With his or her 
contact replying, simply and without actually doing anything, 
“yup”?   
I have absolutely no reason to believe that that is how the 
reviews were conducted.  I do know that the Trump 
administration subsequently paid at least lip service to the issue, 
emphasizing that under an “updated” and “[e]nhanced” set of 
review protocols it has been able to conduct “more in-depth 
analysis” that has “yield[ed] even more granularity and increased 
accuracy regarding each country’s performance under the 
[review] criteria.”447  Then again, the Hirabayashi and Korematsu 
Courts had no particular reason to believe that the West Coast 
curfew and exclusion measures had at their heart impermissible 
racial motives that were masked by specious national security 
claims and the government went to great lengths to suppress key 
evidence in those cases.  As Judge Marilyn Hall Patel stressed 
during the subsequent coram nobis actions, it “knowingly 
 
444.  See, e.g., id. at 2404-05. 
445. Id. at 2443 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
446. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 U.S. 2392, 2443 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  For a 
discussion of these matters and attempts to secure the documents, see Katyal, supra note 46, 
at 654; Eric K. Yamamoto & Rachel Oyama, Masquerading Behind a Facade of National 
Security, 128 YALE L. J. F. 688, 711-12 (2019). 
447. Proclamation No. 9983, 85 Fed. Reg. 6,699, 6,700-01 (Jan. 31, 2020). 
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withheld information from the courts when they were considering 
the critical question of military necessity in this case.”448   
Is that what is happening here?  It is now going on four years 
since the original orders were formulated, supposedly predicated 
on a trustworthy worldwide review, the details of which the 
Trump administration refused to reveal.  In a similar vein, it 
waged a truly incomprehensible campaign to prevent disclosure 
of the so-called Giuliani Commission memorandum, a document 
of potentially immeasurable importance in any assessment of the 
true intent of Proclamation 9645.  This forces anyone interested 
in fully understanding what happened and why to ask: what were 
they hiding?  There may have been executive privilege issues of 
some sort lurking with regard to worldwide reviews after 
President Trump took office.  There cannot possibly be any 
regarding the Giuliani matters.   
Each of these counter-factuals is sheer speculation.  Each 
asks us to think carefully about how we read and react to cases 
within which critical factual details play a dipositive role.  There 
were ample contemporaneous facts and reasons sufficient to reach 
radically different results in both Hirabayashi and Korematsu.  
That said, we cannot discount the extent to which hindsight 
informs our assessments of these decisions and the extent to 
which the Court was led down the primrose path by a record that 
was both incomplete and deceptive.  Korematsu’s place in the 
anticanon is based in significant part on these realities.  What 
other cases might we add to that roll of infamy if similar 
misconduct by the responsible agency or individuals had infected 
the decision-making process? 
CONCLUSION 
This Article is intentionally provocative.  I am fully prepared 
for the many who undoubtedly will say, “how could anyone 
possibly defend Korematsu?”  The answer is simple.  There is 
more to Korematsu than normally meets the eye, and it is those 
often-ignored details and their implications that prompt me to 
make my case.   
 
448. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1417 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
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There is ample support for what Chief Justice Roberts said 
about Korematsu in Trump.  It certainly comports with what Chief 
Justice Stone characterized as “the idea that the law itself is 
something better than its bad precedents,” which “must on 
occasion yield to [] better reason.”449  There is also ample basis 
for sober second thought about Trump’s sober second thought, 
given the lessons derived from what Professor Greene has 
described as “a deeper understanding of the decision than has 
seeped into the popular legal consciousness.”450  It is one thing to 
condemn Korematsu for its result.  It is quite another to 
understand what the issues I have discussed reveal about how the 
case was argued and decided, and how those realities inform both 
the decision and the uses to which it might be put. 
Consider, for example, two recent examples of judicial 
craftsmanship that have garnered both public attention and 
interesting responses from the Supreme Court.  
The first involved an attempt by a majority on the Arkansas 
Supreme Court to avoid the clear language and implications of 
Obergefell v. Hodges, refusing to recognize that decision’s 
express command that a state may not “exclude same-sex couples 
from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-
sex couples.”451  The issue was whether three married same-sex 
couples whose children were conceived by artificial insemination 
had the right to have both of their names placed on their minor 
child’s birth certificates.452  The couples argued that Obergefell 
conferred this right and that the Arkansas statute that barred this 
was unconstitutional.453   
An Arkansas circuit court agreed.454  The Arkansas Supreme 
Court did not, blithely declaring that “Obergefell did not address 
Arkansas’s statutory framework regarding birth certificates, 
either expressly or impliedly.”455  That was manifestly untrue.  It 
is then hardly surprising that the real Supreme Court was not 
amused, summarily reversing in a per curium opinion stating in 
 
449. Stone, supra note 20, at 8. 
450. Greene, supra note 6, at 633. 
451. 576 U.S. 644, 675-76 (2015). 
452. Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 2-3, 505 S.W.3d 169, 172-73. 
453. See id. at 1-2, 505 S.W.3d 169, 172.  
454. See id. at 2, 505 S.W.3d 169, 172.  
455. Id. at 9, 505 S.W.3d 169, 176.  
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no uncertain terms that being named as the parent on a birth 
certificate was one of “‘the constellation of benefits that the States 
have linked to marriage.’”456  
Justice Gorsuch tried to defend what transpired below, 
speaking of “an opinion that did not in any way seek to defy but 
rather earnestly engage Obergefell.”457  But anyone who spends 
even a moment tracking the actual history of what transpired 
below knows that the Arkansas majority did not “earnestly 
engage” anything.  Rather, they continued on a path of calculated 
resistance, refusing to even suggest the slightest possibility they 
approved of same-sex marriages and relationships in a state that 
harbors deep antipathy to such matters and elects its judges.458  
Notably, to date, every court that actually has “earnestly” 
considered these matters has agreed, finding that Obergefell does 
indeed require a state to do exactly what the Arkansas court so 
desperately tried to avoid.459 
 
456. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017) (per curium) (quoting Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,  2601 (2015)). 
457. Id. at 2079 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (Justices Thomas and Alito joined the 
dissent)). 
458. The issues were litigated in Arkansas in various forms, in particular in cases 
challenging Arkansas Amendment 83, an initiated constitutional provision stating that 
“[m]arriage consists only of the union of one man and one woman.”  ARK. CONST. amend. 
83, § 1.  That amendment, and parallel state statutes, were struck down.  See Jernigan v. 
Crane, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1288-89 (E.D. Ark. 2014), aff’d, 796 F.  3d 976 (8th Cir. 2015).  
A state court reached a similar conclusion in Wright v. Arkansas, No. 60CV-13-2662, 2014 
WL 1908815, at *8 (Ark. Cir. May 9, 2014).  That ruling was subsequently stayed by the 
Arkansas Supreme Court on May 16, 2014.  Kevin Conlon and Greg Botelho, Court Halts 
Arkansas Same-Sex Marriages, CNN (May 16, 2014) [https://perma.cc/L8AH-CEHZ].  The 
appeal was argued on November 20, 2014, but the court never issued a decision. Max 
Brantley, A Timeline of the Arkansas Supreme Court and the Same-Sex Marriage Case, ARK. 
TIMES (July 2, 2015) [https://perma.cc/QGL6-LQMS].  It then found solace in the wake of 
Obergefell, dismissing the case as “moot,” thus avoiding the issue in a display of judicial 
“restraint” that reflected politics, not law.  Id.   
459. See, e.g., Henderson v. Box, 947 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 2020) (Indiana law 
requiring the biological mother and father to be listed on the birth certificate held 
unconstitutional); Ayala v. Armstrong, No. 1:16-CV-00501-BLW, 2018 WL 3636524, at *4 
(D. Idaho July 30, 2018) (child born to same sex parents, who would have been married at 
the time of the child’s birth but for Obergefell not happening yet, only had one parent listed 
on birth certificate and must have the other parent listed); Chaisson v. State of La., 239 So.3d 
1074, 1083 (La. App. 4 Cir. Mar. 7, 2018) (court refuses to strike down amended birth 
certificate naming same sex couple as parents because the original birth certificate only listed 
one parent and given Obergefell, the Registrar was legally required to amend the birth 
certificate); Ezell v. Tapia, 2018 WL 3062108, at *1 (Ariz. App. 1st Div. June 21, 2018) 
(given Obergefell, ex-spouse of same sex marriage must be listed as parent on child’s birth 
certificate). 
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The second instructive example arose when an inmate in an 
Arkansas state prison was told that he could not have the one-half 
inch beard he believed was obligated to grow and maintain 
pursuant to his religious beliefs.460  The federal district judge 
approved and adopted the findings of the magistrate judge, who 
used as his baseline the extraordinary deference given prison 
officials when they use “their expert judgment in such matters,”461 
that is, when the prison decision is “‘reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interest.’”462  That was at least a curious, 
if not totally indefensible, decision, given that the case was 
litigated under a different set of rules that forbid reflexive 
deference to prison authorities, the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000.463   
To their credit, both the Magistrate Judge and the Court of 
Appeals acknowledged that the statute existed.  Well, sort of.  
They cited, but did not apply in any meaningful way, the 
heightened scrutiny it required. That is, they did exactly what 
Justice Black did in Korematsu, nodding toward strict scrutiny 
but ignoring its mandates.  This allowed each to hold that the 
prisoner had no cognizable claim, concluding, without any 
analysis or discussion, that the State “met their burden under 
RLUIPA.”464   
Once again, the Supreme Court flatly disagreed, easily 
finding “that the Department’s policy substantially burdens 
petitioner’s religious exercise.”465  It examined the state’s 
proffered justifications with care, concluding that they were “hard 
to take seriously.”466  Indeed, it was the near universal belief at 
the time the case was argued that it was “‘too easy’” and that the 
 
460. See Holt v. Hobbs, 2012 WL 994481 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 27, 2012), aff’d, 2012 WL 
993403 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 23, 2012), aff’d, 509 F. App’x. 561 (8th Cir. 2013). 
461. Holt, 509 Fed App’x. at 562 (citing Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897, 903 (8th Cir. 
2008)). 
462. Holt, 2012 WL 994481 at *6 (quoting Gladson v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 551 F.3d 
825, 832 (8th Cir. 2009)). 
463. Pub. L. No. 106–274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc).  
See Holt, 2012 WL 994481 *6-7 (citing RLUIPA and conceding that the applicable standard 
of review is strict scrutiny). 
464. Holt, 509 F. App’x. at 562. 
465. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 356 (2015). 
466. Id. at 363.  
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attorney dispatched by the state to defend its policy was in effect 
a sacrificial lamb.467  
These episodes provide valuable insights into why 
Korematsu matters.  Both the Pavan and Holt fiascos were 
survivable precisely because the United States Supreme Court 
was both available and willing to provide relief.  But that offers 
scant comfort to the vast majority of litigants, whose cases will 
never see the light of appellate review, much less consideration 
by a Supreme Court that hears only a minuscule portion of the 
cases that arrive at its door.  Then there is Korematsu itself, where 
the court of last resort gave its imprimatur to a government policy 
that rested on flimsy rationales, bolstered by a deliberate 
manipulation of the record.  As Justice Jackson warned in dissent: 
[O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show 
that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the 
Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an 
order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of 
racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of 
transplanting American citizens.468 
It was incumbent on the Court in both Hirabayashi and 
Korematsu to reach different results given its declaration that 
“courts must subject” such measures “to the most rigid 
scrutiny.”469  The majority refused to heed their own mandate.  In 
Hirabayashi, they held that the government policy was 
“reasonable.”  In Korematsu, after declaring that measures like 
the one at issue warranted “the most rigid scrutiny,” they failed to 
actually utilize that standard.  In each instance the Justices glossed 
over key facts before them, ignored pertinent information, and 
were, quite possibly, blinded by their own prejudices and 
precedents.  
That said, any fair reading of Korematsu reveals that there is 
more to the decision than the invidious orders it sustained.  I am 
convinced that the case I make for preserving what I regard as the 
true core and valuable lessons of Korematsu is (dare I say it?) 
compelling.  Many who react solely to my title or my conclusion 
will likely disagree.  Those who read what I have said with care 
 
467. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Say Case of Inmate’s Beard May Not Be the Best 
Test of Religious Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2014, at A16. 
468. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
469. Id. at 216. 
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may also come to a different judgment.  They will presumably do 
so by taking measured issue–sober second thought, if you will–
with the details and merits of my argument and analysis.  If they 
disagree, so be it.  If not, I hope we might together place 
Korematsu in the company of Mark Twain, who famously 
declared that, “‘[t]he report of my death was an exaggeration.’”470 
APPENDIX 
 
  Most of us are familiar with the widespread use of posters 
during World War II, with Rosie the Riveter being perhaps the 
most famous example.  The first set of images in this Appendix 
are posters of a different sort: ones that demonized the Japanese, 
almost invariably with gross racial caricatures.  Yes, the posters 
are offensive.  Which is of course the point.  And so we reprint a 
select few to convey some sense of the social and political climate 
within which the exclusion orders were fashioned and 
implemented, and Korematsu was decided. 
 The second set of images are photographs of one of the 
most notorious relocation camps, Manzanar, located at the foot of 
the Sierra Nevada mountains in California’s Owens Valley (now 
maintained as a National Historic Site).  These were taken by 
Ansel Adams and convey some sense of the setting and 
conditions.  They are a small number of an invaluable collection 
maintained by the Library of Congress.  
 




The Ansel Adams photographs are at: 
 
470. Frank Marshall White, Mark Twain Amused, Humorist Says He Even Heard on 
Good Authority That He was Dead. Cousin, Not He, Sick., N.Y. J., June 2, 1897, at 1 (quoting 
Letter from Mark Twain to Frank Marshall White).  Ironically, there are disputes about the 
extent to which Twain’s writings are racist in nature and should be ignored or condemned.  
Compare, e.g., Jane Smiley, Say It Ain’t So, Huck: Second Thoughts on Mark Twain’s 
‘Masterpiece’, HARPER’S MAG., Jan. 1996, at 61, 63 (“[t]o invest The Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn with ‘greatness’ is to underwrite a very simplistic and evasive theory of 
what racism is and to promulgate it, philosophically, in schools and the media as well as in 
academic journals”), with Justin Kaplan, Selling ‘Huck Finn’ Down the River, N.Y. TIMES 
BOOK REV., Mar. 1996, at 27 (“[y]et [The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn] manages 
somehow, through its humor, lyricism and distinctive, even revolutionary narrative voice, 
not only to survive but to transcend its author’s definition of a classic”). 
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https://www.loc.gov/collections/ansel-adams-                     
manzanar/?sp=3 
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